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## An Enquiry into the Relations Between the Management and the Workforce of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in the Inter-War Period

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An enquiry into the relations between the management  
and the workforce of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in the  
inter-war period

Offered for the degree of M. Phil. in History

March 1994

*The Open University*

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**This is dedicated to my beloved father, Jack McGrath  
(1926 - 1992). I finally got there dad!**

**It is also dedicated to all those employed in British  
breweries who over the past decade have been the  
victims of new strategies, but most especially for  
Trevor Stark.**

**Hilary Margaret Stark, B.A., M.A., P.G.C.E.**

**An Enquiry into the relations between the management and the workforce of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in the inter-war period.**

The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the nature of the working of the management of this particular brewery. A study is made of the the role of the management; the relationship that pertained between the Board of Directors and others employed within the brewery, both as managers and as workers; the working practices that existed within various sections of the company including the nature of career progression that was possible for mangers of the workforce and attitudes to trade unionism.

By studying these aspects of the operation of the brewery in the broader context of the ongoing debate about the nature of workplace relationships, it is demonstrated that the management were implementing two key strategies to control the labour force. These were paternalistic practices, modified by contemporary thinking about the nature of 'welfare work' and internal job ladders. What the work finds it impossible to demonstrate is the extent to which these strategies were being consciously implemented and it seeks to explain why it is hard to reach any firm conclusion.

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## CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this enquiry is to examine the work of one specific company, the brewers Truman, Hanbury and Buxton, in the inter-war period. This will involve a detailed study of the workings of both the management and the work processes of the brewery. In the course of this study an examination will be made, inter alia, of the role of the management, the relationship between the Board of Directors, employed managers and the workforce, working practices, career progression for employees and attitudes to trade unionism. It will become evident that two key strategies were in operation and that these aided the management in their control of the labour force. What is more problematical is the extent to which these two strategies were being consciously implemented by the management as an overt means of labour control.

In order to tackle the various issues that have been raised, the enquiry will be approached in the following way. Chapter II will establish a broad context for the material in terms of three aspects of the brewery. It will examine the geographical location of the brewery in the East End of London; it will examine the key developments in the brewing industry as a whole in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and it will examine the background to the development of this particular company from the late seventeenth century. Chapters III to V will examine

aspects of the management of the brewery, encompassing the paternalistic traditions in which the company operated, the nature of the work performed, both by the family members and by the paid management and the relationships that existed between them. Chapters VI to VIII will, by following the production chain that takes place in the brewing of beer, indicate the work that was done by various groups within the brewery. The advantage of this approach is that it enables the actions of both the management and the workforce to be seen clearly and independently. The most obvious drawback is the fact that management and workers do not operate independently; actions by one group will clearly impinge upon the other. The final chapter will therefore be concerned with integrating the findings in order to show how the workplace relations at Trumans may be used to elucidate some of the current debate about the nature of those relations.

In the past two decades, there has been a proliferation of literature associated with the workplace and the relationships that have existed within it, seeking to explain the ways in which management has employed a variety of strategies beyond the simple cash nexus in order to exercise control over the labour force. This literature has revealed that the strategies employed by different industries, different firms within the same industry, and indeed, by the same firm over a period of time, may well have varied



according to the particular amalgam of needs at any given point in time. As Gospel has pointed out, through the mechanism of strategic choice, management can, within certain constraints, determine the strategies that it pursues and the structural arrangements that it adopts. He further suggests that even where, through their actions, British employers may have given the impression that they were merely behaving in a reactive way to external pressures, this may not have been the case. By studying company structures over a longer period of time, it may reveal that employers carried out clearly defined strategies, even where such strategies were not being overtly articulated. (1) One purpose of this enquiry is to establish both the strategies that were employed by this particular company and the extent to which these strategies were being overtly pursued.

The two strategies that were in operation at Trumans, whether overtly or not, were the use of internal labour markets and the pursuit of paternalistic practices. It is therefore useful at this point to provide an elucidation of the issues associated with these strategies.

Littler (2) has suggested that different types of industrial production engendered different types of labour control. Process industries, with their centralised organisation often gave rise to internal labour markets. One of the fundamental pre-conditions

for this type of control to occur was the existence of a stable and on-going demand for the product in order to make it economically viable to train workers for promotion on an internal job ladder. The use of internal job ladders could benefit management in a variety of different ways. These included the fact that they could be a way of extending employer control over the labour process; that they acted as a mechanism for reducing the leaving rate and that they operated as a method of protecting the firm's investment in training costs. In view of the nature of the type of firm that engendered this sort of form of labour control, it is not especially surprising to find it operating within Trumans.

The traditional view of paternalism has been that it arose with the Industrial revolution in order to legitimise the authority of the factory owners, to establish a subordinate workforce and to instill the social mores of the ruling classes. A useful definition of this traditional view of the paternalistic relationship was offered by J.S. Mill in Principles of Political Economy:

"The relationship between rich and poor should be only partially authoritative; it should be amicable, moral and sentimental; affectionate tutelage on the one side, respectful and grateful deference on the other." (3) Roberts (4) has argued that from about the middle of the nineteenth century, paternalism in this form began to break down as the consequence of the rise of laissez

faire individualism. Joyce, (5) on the other hand, has argued that the relationship between employer and employee was actually strengthened at this point by modifying its characteristics, most notably by establishing the mythology of the employer family which "worked in such a way as to make the appearances of a joint life-style and identity and of direct personal supervision and concern serve the purposes of their reality," (6) which most notably was the continuation of the deferential workforce. He does however concede that such practices had largely disappeared from the cotton industry with the advent of the larger concerns of the 1890s. In brewing, however, the notion of brewery welfare not only persisted, but was apparently strengthened by the advent of the 'Welfare Work' movement at the start of the twentieth century.

The notion of 'Welfare Work' appeared amidst a burgeoning interest in the sorts of strategies that employers could use to improve the efficiency of their enterprises. In many ways, it appeared to be a harking back to some of the central ideas of nineteenth century paternalism. As the Duke of York commented in 1923 on the founding of the Industrial Welfare Society: it "enlarge(s) the old conception of the duty of the employer towards his workers as well as the responsibilities of the workers towards the employers." (7) Yet many contemporaries tried to present this as a new strategy operating in ways that were different from

the old paternalistic relationship. Thus, E.D. Proud, in one of the most influential expositions of the ideas of the British movement, wrote that welfarism "emphasises the common human interests of all...permits and encourages recognition of the workers' attempts at self-help...emphasises personality, but merges individual interests into the common interests of all...a true solidarity of labour is fostered, though perhaps in a somewhat homely and restricted form." (8

It is true that in two important respects welfarism differed from paternalism. There was a widespread feeling that non-wage money payments should not be made on an ex gratia basis because this smacked of charity and did not necessarily secure the future of the worker as such benefits would almost certainly be withdrawn by smaller employers at times of economic recession. Secondly, there was also a feeling that "the test of any scheme of factory organisation is the extent to which it creates and fosters the atmosphere of co-operation and good will, without in any sense lessening the loyalty of the worker to his own class and organisations." (9) This latter feature would have been unlikely to have figured in nineteenth century views of paternalism. Yet, even if one can identify minor differences of emphasis between paternalism and welfarism, many of the motives underlying their implementation were in practice the same. For as Lloyd George pointed out in his introduction to Proud's book:

"beginning with a view mainly to the well-being of the employed, it gradually became evident that welfare supervision was equally beneficial to the employer."

(10) Management utilised both paternalism and welfarism as a matter of "strategic choice" because its ultimate outcome helped them to achieve their objectives, although the emphasis of those objectives was likely to vary from industry to industry and company to company.

Jones has argued that for those employers engaged in welfarism, the "key motive...was the traditional one of promoting the tripod of efficiency; technical skill; health and discipline." (11) It is to an analysis of these three elements that attention will now be directed. The start of the twentieth century saw many changes for British employers. Staple industries needed to become more efficient in the face of foreign competition which was often organised on a corporate basis. Whilst brewing did not face such foreign competition, and indeed was actually strengthened by its control of its distribution and retail outlets, it too was under different types of pressure, caused by the economic conditions of the period. Such pressures were made more overt in the minds of the brewers by the vociferous agitations undertaken by the anti-drinks lobby. It seems likely then that brewing employers would have been interested in the contemporary debates on management strategy which were looking at more efficient methods of utilising the labour force.

Welfarism was likely to strike a chord in the minds of the brewers in the sense that many of the practices being advocated would not have involved any new or radical departures, but would have justified existing practices in the jargon of the day. For example, "there can be little doubt that under a policy of this sort wisely carried out, a given sum of money will react more forcibly on the quality of the work people than it would do if simply handed over to the worker in the form of coin." (12) According to Jones, (13) those new industries of the 1930s that needed to attract a skilled labour force were particularly interested in welfare work schemes because they believed that this would stimulate the acquisition of the type of labour force they required. Equally, those companies that had spent some time training their workforce might use some type of welfare scheme in order to prevent a high, and more importantly, a costly, labour turn-over. Welfare provision could thus act as an incentive to remain within a company, facilitating the existence of internal labour markets within that firm.

The third element of Jones' "tripod" was that of health and discipline. This is clearly bound up with notions of efficiency, for the healthier and more disciplined a workforce, then clearly the more likely it was to be efficient. Health could be promoted in a variety of ways: making sports provision available (which could simultaneously serve other purposes,

including the creation of a team spirit which might be transferred to the workplace; the sublimation of potential social conflict between employer and employee; free publicity in the local press should the team achieve some degree of success); providing canteen facilities for both breakfast and lunch, where the worker was likely to pay the full economic cost of the food, but the employer would probably underwrite the costs of running the facility; providing some element of medical care which might be preventative (inspection by company doctors, vaccination on site) or curative (hospital treatment or convalescence).

It is clear that some employers were using welfare schemes as an overt means of exercising control over their labour force. Melling, (14) for example, by drawing on the engineering industry, has shown that in that sector, welfarism was a conscious strategy designed by employers to gain control of the workplace whilst simultaneously demonstrating the legitimacy of their situation. This interpretation has found support in Lewchuk's study of British car employers, where he suggests that their use of consultation, a typical element of welfare schemes, was merely a device to legitimise control, rather than a real sharing of the decision-making process. (15) This is, in point of fact, a view that may be found reflected in the comments of contemporary employers; Rowntree, for example, argued that "those who accept ultimate

financial liability must retain ultimate responsibility." (16) Welfarism might also be used as a means of circumventing and undercutting trade union activity. Waller (17) has indicated its use in this way in the collieries, whilst Reader (18) has shown that although ICI in the 1920s did not act in this way as the consequence of a conscious strategy decision, when they became aware that it was having this effect, they deemed it a successful policy.

Hannah, (19) on the other hand, has suggested that many companies were pursuing welfare schemes without any clear realisation that these provisions could be used as an overt strategy of management control over the workplace. Rather, many saw it in vague terms as something that might possibly increase worker loyalty and therefore have some ill-defined advantage for them.

There were thus a potentially wide and complex variety of motives that impinged on employers, not just in different industries, nor even in different companies, but even in the same company over a period of time. Some motives were overt and clearly articulated, others were vague and rather ill-defined. It might be argued that what all shared was ultimately the desire to maintain productivity and profitability. Yet this type of argument oversimplifies the very real conflict that was apparently experienced by some employers, such as those associated with the Quaker



ethos, as parts of the founding families of Trumans were. It seems likely that intertwined with more conventional attitudes towards the motives of management, there was some degree of altruism, some "genuine feeling for the rights of workers and a real commitment to fair dealing in employment contracts."

(20) Such an action almost certainly arose out of the need to legitimise their business actions in order to resolve an inherent conflict with their religious values and beliefs. It must not be forgotten though, that brewers who did not share these values and beliefs had reached similar conclusions about the efficacy of implementing welfare schemes. This suggests that welfarist strategies, whilst coinciding with a particular ethos, were also a highly effective means of achieving a variety of ends.

#### FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I

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4. D. Roberts, Paternalism in Early Victorian England, London, 1979
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7. Quoted in H. Jones, "Employers Welfare Schemes and Industrial Relations in Inter-War Britain," Business History, XXVII, (1983), 62
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9. E. Cadbury, Experiments in Industrial Organisation, London, 1912, p.xvii
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12. Quoted in E.D. Proud, op. cit., p.63
13. H. Jones, op. cit., 62
14. J. Melling, "Employers Industrial Welfare and the Struggle for Workplace Control in British Industry 1880 - 1920," in Gospel and Littler, op. cit., p.62

15. W.A. Lewchuk, "Fordism and British Motor Car Employers, 1896 - 1932," in Gospel and Littler, op. cit., p.94
16. Quoted in H. Jones, op. cit., 64
17. R.J. Waller, The Dukeries Transformed, Oxford, 1983, p.105 - 106
18. Quoted in H. Jones, op. cit., 64
19. L. Hannah, Inventing Retirement, Cambridge, 1986, p.23
20. ibid., p.22

## CHAPTER II - THE SETTING

### I - London's East End

The brewery founded by Benjamin Truman in 1666 is located in Brick Lane. It is bounded on the south by the Commercial Road and on the north by the Old Nichol, an area whose character has been committed to fiction by Arthur Morrison's A Child of the Jago, and more recently been revealed by Raphael Samuel's interviews with Arthur Harding. The brewery thus lies in the heart of the East End, an area whose deprivations and depravities have exercised a fascination for contemporary observers since the early nineteenth century. These have contributed to the creation of the popular stereotypes and images of this part of London. Booth's survey suggested that in 1887, 35 per cent of the population of Tower Hamlets were living below the poverty line, including 13 per cent who were "chronically distressed." (1) It was the poverty stricken conditions of this group that gave rise to the types of description that many came to apply to the East End as a whole. One example of this, in the type of extravagant terms that typified the period, is this account by W. Mearns:

the poor have been growing poorer, the wretched more miserable and the immoral more corrupt.... Few who will read these pages have any conception of what these

pestilential rookeries are.... To get to them you have to penetrate courts seeking with malodorous gases...you have to grope your way along dark and filthy passages swarming with vermin...then you may gain admittance to the dens in which these thousands of beings herd together. (2)

A further example of this type of writing, which refers specifically to Brick Lane is this account by J.H. MacKay:

Whoever has once slowly sauntered through Brick Lane can say that he has been grazed by the pestilential breath of want; whoever has gone astray in its side streets has walked along the edge of the abyss of human suffering. Whoever would like to see how much human nature can endure...let him visit the battle field of Brick Lane, where men do not fall with skulls cracked and hearts shot through, but where hunger cuts them down easily after want has deprived them of their last force of resistance. (3)

Such images of the East End are legion. This inherent poverty came to be seen by many as a consequence of the perceived industrial structure of the area. Walter Besant, for example, in interpreting Booth's figures, suggested that as much as 75 per cent

of the East End's workforce were casually employed. (4) It has recently been argued by Southall (5) that such a concentration on the problems of London were misplaced. Contemporaries assumed that London's problems were worse than those being experienced in the provinces and focused their attentions accordingly. Using statistical data from a variety of sources, such as trade union records and National Insurance records, Southall has concluded that although London's unemployment was marginally worse than that which existed in its immediate hinterland, it was nonetheless substantially lower than that which pertained in the North. Despite such recent modifications in interpretation, the focus of the plethora of literature that exists on London and its labour market concentrates upon the poorest elements of the East End.

It has been suggested that casual labour arose as London's response to an increasing demand that had been engendered by a growth in population. Instead of responding to this by developing a factory system among London's established industries, it led to the sub-division of production, using simple and comparatively inexpensive hand-driven machinery, where appropriate. This also had the advantage that producers were able to respond rapidly to changes in style, whether in clothing, footwear or furniture. This type of labour market made it possible largely to dispense

with skilled labour and carry out production in small workshops or in the home. This was a necessary aspect of the system as the sub-contractors often worked on very small margins of capital investment: Mayhew, for example, pointed to the furniture makers who needed to sell the goods already produced in order to buy the materials to make the next item. (6) Once the technical problems had been solved, however, and the conditions of mass demand for cheap ready-made goods had been established, manufacturers were able to take advantage of a cheap over-filled labour pool, an important element of which was women and immigrants, who were prepared to work for subsistence wages.

Women were attracted to this labour pool because of a lack of skills, generally combined with reduced circumstances, such as might be occasioned by the illness, death, unemployment or underemployment of a husband. In 1907, over 50 per cent of women employed working in their own homes in the clothing trade of West Ham were the wives of men in casual employment, such as builders, general labourers and dock labourers. (7) Arriving immigrants were likely to be attracted to areas where fellow immigrants had already settled because this would provide them with a secure social network. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, Jewish immigrants would come to the East End because earlier immigrants had already settled there, some of them having developed their own small-scale units of

production. For many immigrants, this would provide their point of entry into the sweated trades.

It was this external sub-contract of the sweated trades and the attempts by various groups of workers, such as the Jewish tailors in 1907, to overthrow this system of control that have provided the central themes for many historians studying the labour markets of the East End. Yet at the start of the nineteenth century, it had not been inevitable that this was the type of industrial production that London would develop, for it was in the East End that "the new processes of large scale production with the use of power were taking root: Stepney then had its large breweries, distilleries, sailcloth factories, glass houses and sugar refineries." (8) It can be argued that the system of casual and sweated labour dated from the opening of the new London docks in 1805, which attracted many small industries to occupy the open land of the district. In turn, the existence of a number of small industries in the area attracted a labour force, which although initially containing a skilled element, would by the later nineteenth century, have become the sweated workforce through a process of the sub-division of labour which would lead to de-skilling. Bedarida has clearly identified a pattern of development taking place in Poplar (9) which shares a number of common features with this general pattern. Until 1800, this district was predominantly rural with the only large



employer being the Blackwall shipyard. Following the opening of the West India Docks in 1802, the population quintupled in the period to 1840 during which time a number of factories were opened on the poorer land of the district. Whilst there continued to be opportunities for skilled employment, such as metal work and engineering, there was also an extensive casual labour market, both in the new factories such as jam and in transport.

By the end of the nineteenth century, casual and sweated labour had emerged as the norm for many of those employed in the East End, but the large-scale enterprises which had been typical of the start of the century had not disappeared, but had continued to operate and provide employment for many East Enders: a jute factory in Stratford-le-Bow employed one thousand workers, Samuda Brothers, iron ship builders employed a similar number of permanent workers and a further thousand casual workers, whilst Trumans, who were a capital-intensive rather than a labour-intensive operation, nonetheless had a workforce of four hundred and fifty employees. (10) Indeed, the scale of brewing in London, led George Dodd to comment that "the London porter breweries...are among the lions of the Metropolis; so vast are their dimensions, their vessels, their plans of operations and the capital invested." (11) And of these 'lions' Trumans was in the first rank. It was consistently the largest of the East

End breweries (the others being Mann, Crossman and Paulin, Red Lion and Taylor Walker). It was the third largest of all the London breweries in the early nineteenth century, and for a short period in the 1870s it was the largest London brewer.

East End employment can therefore be seen to be substantially more diverse than traditional approaches might suggest. This is confirmed in Bedarida's findings in which he suggests that a "remarkable feature" of Poplar was "its combination of large factories and small workshops." (12) Such a combination, both in Poplar and elsewhere in the East End meant that there existed in London, labour markets other than those that characterised the sweated and casual trades. This view is confirmed thus by Bedarida: "To insist on the metropolis being dominated by small businesses is to miss the considerable part played by some large and medium-scale concentrated enterprises." (13) These workplaces would produce patterns of employment and control as distinctive as any exhibited in the more 'typical' London trades, as this enquiry into the nature of employment at a specific London brewery seeks to demonstrate.

## **II - Brewing in the late nineteenth century**

In 1699, there were 194 common brewers in London (14), many of whom were producing beer in a semi-domestic fashion, frequently for consumption on their own premises. In the course of the eighteenth century, whilst the number of brewers declined, the scale of operations of those remaining increased. The reasons for this change was that brewing was "technologically very suited for large scale production within the single plant" (15) and that it did not require new forms of power or transport improvements to provide the impetus for such an industrial take-off. Once such improvements had occurred and demonstrated their worth, however, the industry was generally prepared to make use of them. Trumans was to prove absolutely typical in this respect, rarely being at the forefront of innovation, but frequently following in its slipstream. The process of change was encouraged throughout the century by the continued demand for beer. (See Appendix II, footnote 16)

The latter part of the nineteenth century saw four major developments that were to have subsequent repercussions on the industry in the inter-war period: technical innovation, changes in management techniques, the 'Brewery Wars' and government legislation. This section will examine each of these developments as they affected the industry in general.

Technical innovation had been taking place since

the start of the nineteenth century. London brewers had been among the first of Boulton and Watt's customers, with Trumans acquiring a steam engine relatively late in the day in 1805. Brewers were quick too, to see the opportunities offered by refrigeration, which freed them from the constraints of having to produce at fixed volumes and enabled them to store beers in special cellars; by 1889, Trumans had five ether and one ammonia type of refrigerating machines. Other machines that came to be widely used in this period included Steel's mashing machine of 1853 and Robert's sparging machine of 1869. Advances were made too in the bottling of beer, which gradually came to be fully mechanised on the conveyer belt principle. By 1905, the principal method for bottling involved the production of carbonated beer by exerting the artificial pressure of carbonic acid gas on a chilled and filtered beer. This proved to be both economical and efficient: particularly important in bottling as the margin of profit was low. Further improvements were made by the employment of chemists to analyse problems in the beer making process; these included advances in the types of yeast used, the varieties of barley grown and in the sorts of cheaper substitutes that could be used in all areas of the brewing process.

The employment of chemists to achieve both economies and a better end product indicate a growing awareness of the need to utilise specialists where

appropriate. That such specialists should have the proper training was also becoming accepted practice amongst the brewing employers. Thus in 1895, members of the Yorkshire Institute of Brewers were told that the days had long gone when a brewery could be regarded as the "last resource for a young man when having failed for the Army, the Church or one of the learned professions, his premium is paid and he is shipped off to some pupil-taking brewery with the idea that at least we can make a brewer of him." (17) Such a recognition of the need for proper training was not merely discussed by the brewers, but was also put effectively into practice. Birmingham brewers, for example, endowed the British School of Malting and Brewing at Birmingham University in 1900.

Specialists were used not just in the brewing processes, but in a wide variety of functions, including, for example, designing the layout of the plant in order to optimise output. Such a role would have been particularly important at Trumans where some of the brewery's work was still carried out in buildings that had been erected in the seventeenth century and much of the other work was carried out in buildings that had been developed in an ad hoc way since that time. It was not until the first half of the 1920s that an organised building programme was instituted, and even this was to find itself quickly outmoded as the brewery abandoned horse drays for motor

transport. There was thus a new emphasis on the ability of management to have a close working knowledge of the scientific basis of management, or at the very least, to employ someone who did. This was not, however, to be implemented in such a way that it would lead to a more "professional" form of management that would tend to reduce the influence of the Board of Directors.

The 1880s saw the beginning of a move to float breweries on the Stock Exchange. By 1890, more than two hundred breweries had been floated, whilst between 1886 and 1900, £185 million pounds worth of brewing shares had been issued. (18) Such fundamental financial readjustments within the industry were clearly going to have many far-reaching effects, of which the reduction in the number of breweries by 42.9 per cent from 11,322 to 6,460 is perhaps the most striking. (19) Briefly, the way in which the 'Brewery Wars' led to this outcome was that after flotation, even relatively small breweries were likely to have a reasonable amount of capital for expenditure. There were two main possibilities for the use of this capital; one was to expand the scale of production, the other was to expand the potential retail outlet of the product. The latter course appeared to be a particularly attractive one to many breweries. In a period of growing population, the number of licenses were actually diminishing: from 104,792 in 1886 to 98,742 in 1906. (20) Despite the improvements in refrigeration, beer still had a limited

lifespan and demand could best be gauged if the brewer had control of his outlets. Such control would also enable the brewer to protect his own branded products and prevent the possibility of a discount war.

The larger London breweries had utilised the loan tie system from a fairly early date. This had involved them in lending money to an independent publican in return for the right to be that publican's sole supplier. By the mid 1880s this system was under threat: Burton brewers with their distinctive pale ale that could not be brewed in London because of the high carbonate and low sulphate content of the capital's water supply, had penetrated the London market. This threat was exacerbated still further by a decline in the per capita consumption of beer. Nonetheless, in the early years after flotation, the large London brewers do not appear to have used their capital to purchase public houses on long leases: Trumans, for example, had 215 tied houses in 1890, but only an additional four by 1892. From 1892, the situation changed, with London brewers becoming increasingly aware of the advantages of owning tied property, with prices of these reaching very high levels for at least a decade as a result. This in its turn created problems for some companies. As E.N. Buxton was to remark in his evidence to the Royal Commission on Liquor Licensing in 1897:

a very great change has taken place in the last five years. Probably some one or two

firms endeavoured to increase their trade at the expense of others. Naturally every company tries to protect itself, and at least to save its own trade, and any firm which has not done so in the last five years would certainly have gone to the wall. (21)

Prices only really began to slow down again after the 1909 Budget, which depreciated the values of licensed properties, but by that time, according to Monckton, 95 per cent of all premises had become tied.

Two factors in this process led to a decline in the number of breweries. Firstly, once the price of acquiring tied property had begun to rise, smaller breweries could no longer compete, and were thus excluded from this avenue of ensuring an outlet for their product. Even if some tied property had been bought, it was likely to have been at inflated prices, and even for some of the big companies could involve a financial loss. As Cosmo Bonsor of Watney, Combe and Reid commented in 1904:

This company carried on practically two businesses. They were manufacturers and sellers of beer. This part of their business was as good as ever. It was the other portion of the business in which they dealt in the securities of licensed houses, that the losses came from. (23)



Secondly, once there were effectively no more tied houses to be purchased nor any further prime sites to be developed, the only way for a brewery to enlarge its scale of operations was through mergers. This usually proved to be a larger firm buying up a smaller firm and in the process, acquiring its tied outlets, but on occasion, was smaller firms coming together to protect themselves in an increasingly competitive market. Thus, the battle to acquire outlets and the financial problems that this engendered for both large and small London brewers was precipitated by the flotations of the 1880s, but was to fundamentally affect the financial structure of the breweries well into the twentieth century.

Many nineteenth century commentators saw alcohol as "almost the exclusive cause of such ills as pauperism, insanity and crime," (24) whilst in 1915, Lloyd George felt impelled to suggest that "drink is doing us more damage than all the German submarines put together." (25) The contemporary brewing industry perceived the legislative activity that such views gave rise to as being yet one further factor in the variety of problems that had to be dealt with. Gourvish and Wilson (26) have shown that the significance of this in restricting the profitability of the industry was exaggerated at the time. Nonetheless, certain aspects of wartime controls were to continue to have an effect on the post-war industry. Following the Compulsory

Dilution Order of 1916 post-war levels of gravity would never again match pre-war levels. More importantly, the rising cost per unit of production caused by falling output imposed on the industry in order to release land from hop and barley growing for more essential foods, reinforced by wartime exigencies such as the requisitioning of lorries and the shortage of man-power, exacerbated the problems already being faced by the less efficient companies. This led to a further wave of mergers as the larger companies took advantage of the situation to consolidate their market position. One further side-effect of the war was that via the Carlisle experiment, it had been shown that the provision of amenities such as entertainment and recreation, far from encouraging drunkenness, as the scheme's detractors had anticipated, actually encouraged better behaviour. In the post-war period, this was to be translated by the brewery companies into a positive attempt to make many improvements to licensed premises in order to broaden their appeal to a wider clientele.

It can therefore be seen that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were significant developments in a wide variety of areas that impinged on the conduct and policies of brewery companies. Both the direct and the indirect effects of these developments continued to exercise their influence in the inter-war period.

### III - The Firm

While optimists may attempt to trace the origins of Trumans back to 1381 when a brewer by the name of William Truman attacked the Lord Mayor of London during Wat Tyler's revolt and traditionalists accept the references made in a nineteenth century letter to lost business papers which showed the brewery to be established in 1666, the first concrete evidence of a brewery on the Brick Lane site dates from 1683. In that year, Joseph Truman appeared in the register of St. Dunstan's Church as 'brewer of brick lane' (sic). It is not clear if Joseph Truman owned the brewery from the onset or if he was simply an employee of William Bucknall who owned the land on which it was built. Certainly, at some point before 1690, possibly on Bucknall's death in 1679, he had come into possession of a brew house, for in that year he was fined by the Brewer's Company for being an interloper, who was brewing while not a member of the company. This situation he subsequently rectified.

Among a number of partners in the enterprises, it was one of Joseph's sons, Benjamin, who was to prove the most active and the most astute. Traditional accounts of the history of the company also suggest that good fortune played an important role, pointing to a story published in Coleman's Manners and Customs in London in the Eighteenth Century. One such source for this account is to be found in the company's

tricentennial publication.

When the Duchess of Brunswick was born in 1737, the Prince of Wales ordered four loads of faggots and a number of tar barrels to be burned before Carlton House to celebrate the event and directed the Brewer to his household to place four barrels of beer near it for those who chose to partake of the beverage which certain individuals had no sooner done than they pronounced the liquid of inferior quality.

This declaration caused a riot: the beer was thrown by the crowd over each other and the barrels were thrown onto the bonfire. To calm the situation down, the Prince declared that additional celebrations would be held on the following night, but on this occasion the beer was obtained from Trumans, which led Coleman to observe that "the populace was pleased and satisfied with this alternative." (27) Trumans had thus obtained a royal seal of approval.

Such lucky stories apart, the period in which Benjamin Truman was at the head of the company was one of expansion and consolidation for the brewery. He acquired new properties and leases for his products; he introduced the brewing of porter to the company, which was to have long-term implications. Porter could be brewed on a much larger scale than the type of ale that

the company had been producing hitherto because it did not deteriorate so rapidly. In order to achieve the maximum scale of production that was possible, the Brick Lane site had to be redesigned. This more effective layout would enable the company to be producing 60,000 barrels of porter a year by 1760, making it the third largest London brewer, and would provide the basis on which future expansion could take place.

In recognition of his role as a leading London businessman, Benjamin Truman was knighted on the accession of George III in 1760. By the time of his death in 1780, his only son had predeceased him and his daughter's two sons showed little interest in the family business. In consequence, he left a one-eighteenth share in the brewery to his grandson William Truman Read, but the bulk of his £180,000 estate, together with a share of seventeen-eighteenths in the brewery, he left in trust to the sons of his granddaughter, Frances Read Villebois. To execute the will and oversee the running of the brewery, he appointed his Head Clerk, James Grant, who was to fulfill this role for ten years, in which period he acquired William Truman Read's share. On his death this share was sold to Sampson Hanbury, who took over the running of the day to day affairs of the brewery. This position he filled until his death forty-six years later, building up his share-holding from

one-eighteenth to one-third in this period with Benjamin Truman's two grandsons remaining as sleeping partners throughout. Like Benjamin Truman, Sampson Hanbury had no direct male heirs, so before his death he brought his nephew, Thomas Fowell Buxton into the firm in 1808, making him a partner in 1811 with two shares. This then completed the triumverate of names by which the company was to be known: Truman, Hanbury and Buxton.

These latter two families were to bring more than just capital and effective management to the company: they would also imbue it with their own religious and political ethos. By the late nineteenth century, "the brewer wealth-holders were as homogeneous as any group of wealth-holders," (28) with the basis of that homogeneity being membership of the Anglican church and Conservative politics. By contrast, the Hanburys tended to be mainly Quaker in persuasion, whilst the Buxtons were more likely to be evangelical, although they showed much sympathy for the Quaker perspective. Indeed, Thomas Fowell Buxton married Hannah Gurney, one of the Earlham Gurneys whom he had known from the age of fifteen. He himself wrote of his links with this well-known Quaker family: "I know of no blessing of a temporal nature (and it is not only temporal) for which I ought to render so many thanks as my connexion with the Earlham family. It has given colour to my life. Its influence was most positive and pregnant with good."

(29) This influence encouraged him to devote much of his time and energy to working for the unfortunate; he was the 'Slave Liberator' who saw Wilberforce's work through to its logical conclusion; he gave freely to charities such as the London Hospital and contributed generously to ease the plight of the Spitalfields weavers. He thus "early set the well known tradition of the Black Eagle Brewery for unostentatious philanthropy and charitable benevolence," (30) which would be pursued by both the Buxtons and the Hanburys over the following decades. Such an ethos was evident too in the attitudes that existed towards those who were employed in the brewery. In view of the evident divergence between these families and that of the majority of brewery owners, it is vital to establish the extent to which it was the process or the family background that determined the methods of management that were implemented.

The completion of the name by which the company was to be known did not however complete the families who were to comprise the ownership of the company. The fourth and final element of the brewery were the Pryors of Shoreditch. In 1816, their lease on Proctor's Brewery lapsed and they sought to invest their capital and knowledge in another brewery. In Hanbury's words: "From particular family connections with Buxton and me, both they and their friends are extremely desirous of engaging them with us...they can bring trade with them,

which is about 20,00 barrels - they will add capital."

(31) Thus, by 1816, the basic infrastructure of the company had been laid down, with the founding family of Truman effectively playing no further role in the management of the company.

There were two other developments in the nineteenth century that ought, at this point, to be noted. Firstly, in 1839, the railways reached Burton. This enabled the penetration of their light sparkling ale into other parts of the country. If a London brewer wanted to produce Burton ale, it had to acquire a Burton brewery and this Trumans did in 1873, quickly making a success of it. By 1880, it was amongst the group of five brewers who ranked in size behind the dominant two in the town and was employing more than one hundred and seventy workers. (32) The second development came in the 1880s; like so many other breweries at this time, the company decided to float itself on the Stock Exchange as a limited liability company. Having discussed the possibility of doing this during the course of 1888, the company was formally registered in 1889. Its authorised capital issue was £1,850,000. The three families took up the ordinary and preferred ordinary share issue of £1,315,000, with 6,175 shares going to the Buxtons, 3,650 to the Hanburys and 2,325 to the Pryors. Ownership of the shares gave the owner the right to vote at shareholders meetings on issues that affected their rights, being



possessed of one vote per £10 of capital. In addition to the share issue, there was also a debenture issue of which one-third, amounting to £400,000, remained in the hands of the three families.

In practice, the flotation made very little difference to the structure of management of the firm. The erstwhile partners of the company became the new Board of Directors and the Senior Partner, Arthur Pryor, became the Chairman of the Board of Directors. Indeed, it was 1954 before a Director was appointed who came from outside the three families and their immediate descendants. Even when this did occur, the individual concerned, H. Mallen, had already been the General Manager of the company for the not inconsiderable period of twenty-five years. Such continuity of management was not confined to Trumans, but was widespread throughout brewing, as Chandler has pointed out. "Although most breweries were incorporated they continued to be run as partnerships." (33) What the flotation and a subsequent debenture issue in 1897 did do, was to provide the company with increased capital. By 1901, £3 million had been invested in property in order to maintain the company's trading position. In view of the fact that such property assets were included as part of the calculation in determining the market value of shares, it is not surprising that Trumans consistently figured in the index of the top two hundred industrial enterprises in Great Britain. In

1919, Trumans was listed at number 133 with £1.7 million; in 1930, it was listed at number 77 with £4.6 million and in 1948 at number 92 with £8.8 million. For the two earlier years, this meant that it was the sixteenth most valuable brewery in the country, rising to the fourteenth position after the Second World War.

(34)

#### IV - Sources

The principal contemporary sources that have been used in this study are the company records of Truman Hanbury and Buxton which are lodged at the Greater London Record Office under the care of Ms. Harriet Keneally, whose support and co-operation were invaluable in the course of this research. The records have not, as yet, been catalogued, and therefore great reliance had to be place on Ms. Keneally's knowledge of the archives. Among the sources consulted were the following items: Monthly Reports 1908 - 38, Clerks salaries and Rest expenses 1898 - 1932, Clerks agreements 1914 - 37, Thursday memoranda 1915 - 25, Black Eagle 1929 - 35, together with some post-war editions, which provided eulogies for long serving employees and obituaries of those who had been long serving employees, even if they had retired before their deaths, personal correspondence folder, letters book 1914 - 27, Directors Orders books for Stenhouse and Smith, Expense book 1930 - 32, Main ledger 1930 - 40, Rest book 1906 - 43, Dissection book 1927 - 33, Rest expense memo 1852 - 1952, Pensions and gratuities 1919 - 30, Workmens' presents 1910 - 23, 1924 - 30 and 1931 - 39, Brewers' men 1920 - 39, Draymen's wages summary 1901 - 21, Draymen 1907 - 11, 1920 - 35, Draymen's wages book 1904 - 19, wages book 1917 - 20, Savings bank ledger 1908 - 26, 1927 - 46. The other principal contemporary source that was consulted were

the Directors' Minutes Books, which at the time of use were still housed at the Brewery at Brick Lane; my thanks for access to these and for providing an office to peruse them over a number of weeks goes to John Baker, a former Personnel Director with the company.

It is clear from the list presented in the previous paragraph that a wealth of records relating to this company have survived, but their use has posed certain problems. Firstly, many of them were simply financial accounts with little or no explanation as to what the figures related to. This type of source could not effectively be used in this enquiry. Secondly, none of the sources used made any explicit reference to the key areas that this enquiry is focused upon. For those associated with the brewery, it seems likely that such issues were implicitly understood by all those involved. As Chandler has pointed out, even among the largest British companies, where they were controlled by family members, "working closely together at the office in or near the plant...they had little need for charts and tables to define and explain their organisation to themselves or others." (35) However, for the historian trying to reconstruct hierarchies, attitudes and patterns of behaviour, conclusions can only be inferred on the basis of the implicit evidence provided. Thirdly, there were gaps within the sources. This could be in terms of missing years within longer runs of material, such as Draymen 1912 - 19 or in

apparent gaps for entire sections of the brewery. There is, for example, no separate material on either the Transport department or the Wharf, although the latter may have maintained separate records that were never passed over to the main brewery. In any event, any conclusions drawn about either of these departments are based on references made to them in other materials, which may very well present them from the perspective of that department, rather than in their own light. Another significant gap seems to be the Directors Orders books. As there were five heads of department and as two of these men had such a book, it seems to be a reasonable assumption to make that all five men possessed their own copy. The two surviving books outline general brewer policy, but they also include specific issues that impinge on the working of the particular department. Fourthly, all of these records are 'official' records; issues are explored exclusively from the perspective of the management and the reaction of the workforce to the decisions that affect them is virtually always presented in deferential terms, such as the letter sent by twenty of the company's Foremen:

Dear Mr. Gerald,

Will you please convey to the shareholders and accept yourself this expression of our sincere and grateful thanks, for promise of an extra week's wages and also the assurance of our determined endeavour to keep on the

prosperity of the good old firm of THB & Co.

through good times or bad. (36)

Whilst it seems likely that such emotions were genuinely held, it seems totally improbable that they were the only form of response ever exhibited by the workforce. Yet even when strike activity is being reported, the manner of the workforce is presented in the most deferential of terms. Such problems must be borne in mind when utilising the materials, yet the sheer amount that has survived, not just from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but from the beginning of the brewery in the seventeenth century, makes the archive at the Greater London record Office an important source for any historian interested in examining the development and management of a successful London brewery.

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### CHAPTER III - MANAGEMENT OF THE BREWERY: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

As has already been indicated, the flotation of the company in 1889 changed the terminology associated with the management, but not the essential structures that had been in operation since the early nineteenth century. In the next three chapters, an attempt will be made to identify the key influences that operated upon the management and determined the techniques that they used to expedite business. An attempt will be made to ascertain how far such strategies were consciously orchestrated and how far they were innate, either because of the nature of the firm or the nature of the families who were involved. In order to achieve this, an examination will be made of the type of work that was carried out by the management and an attempt will be made to reconstruct the management hierarchy, demonstrating the relationship between members of the families and paid managers. This will be organised so that in this chapter, a general survey of the work of the Board of Directors who came from the three families will be studied; in chapter IV, an attempt will be made to analyse some of the motivations that underlay this conduct, whilst simultaneously expanding upon the provisions that were made by the company for the workforce; in chapter V, the nature of the work of the employed management will be examined and some conclusions based on the material of these three

chapters will be drawn.

It was determined at a Board meeting on April 29th, 1898, that in order to become a member of the Board of Directors, a holding of one hundred shares was required. This meeting also established the principle of membership of the Board by members of the three families: "while it is expedient that each of the three families who comprises the present shareholders should be represented, we wish to emphasise the fact that mere parentage conveys no right nor claim for election." (1) At the time of the flotation in 1889, 6,175 shares were held by the twelve members of the Buxton family, 3,650 by the eleven members of the Hanbury family and 2,325 by the six members of the Pryor family. This meant that the Buxtons owned 50.8 per cent of the company, the Hanburys owned 30 per cent and the Pryors 19 per cent. It was anticipated that the number of shareholders with more than one hundred shares would increase as deaths among the original group of twenty-nine led to their shares being bequeathed to more than one of their descendants, thus providing a permanent pool of talent to be tapped for the benefit of the brewery.

There appears to have been a widespread enthusiasm for involvement in the brewery among the families; two examples may serve to illustrate this point. Firstly, Noel Buxton writing to Edwy (E.N. Buxton) in an undated letter, probably stemming from the early 1930s, commented: "by the way, you asked me

the other day what my boys were going to do. I should very much like to see one of them in the brewery if he proved to have a useful business capacity." (2) Secondly, in a letter from A.V. Pryor, who had married the Countess of Wilton late in life, and had no children of his own, to the Board of Directors: "I wish to put on record that I am hoping that my nephew, John Pryor, age fourteen, will be allowed to become a candidate for a directorship in Truman, Hanbury, Buxton and Company when the proper time comes." (3) According to John Pryor himself some thirty years later, this was not what he had wanted: "My elder brother died...and I was informed that I must give up all idea of the Army as I was designated for the Brewery." (4)

Such commitment to involvement arose from a complex variety of factors that ranged from self-interest, ensuring the continued profitability and advancement of the company, through to a feeling that familial continuity created moral obligations on the part of the owners to their workforce. This latter point is well illustrated in a further undated letter from Noel Buxton to Edwy: "On moral grounds...we could as a private affair do as we thought right by the men and in other ways and I think there is a strong argument in our case, arising from the Buxton tradition in particular. It is a remarkable piece of history, begun by the Slave Liberator - of business combined with public work - and now represented in the fifth

generation by yourself.... With production dwindled and yet unemployment trebled, the profit-making motive is not proving very adequate. But that is largely because capital in the ordinary form is irresponsible and non-moral. Trumans represents a form of capital that is too uncommon." (5) This apparantly private letter suggests that there existed a real sense of the duty of employers on the part of Noel Buxton, a sense that sprang from religious conviction, according to his biographer: "there was a remoteness between the employers and the workers which Buxton felt was inconsistent with the Christian outlook and laboured to bridge." (6)

Mere enthusiasm however, was never sufficient to guarantee a successful candidacy for Board membership. Ability was always a prerequisite; this point was clearly demonstrated in the letter already cited in the preceding paragraph: "When you speak of the advantage of keeping each family in a degree of balance, I would quantify that by the even greater importance of your other point - that selection for fitness should be stringent." (7) It was however possible to become a Director with no real experience of the work of the brewery, as for example, Christine Hanbury did on the death of her husband in 1923. This though, may have had more to do with the increasing number of women being employed at the brewery from the 1920s, which may have engendered a feeling that there ought to be a female

Director who would closely associate herself with their welfare. As Mrs. Martindale, a Senior Lady Inspector of Factories had indicated as early as 1911: "At times, when I am inspecting a factory, I find myself wishing that the employer's wife would also inspect it, as benefits for women workers would, I am sure, be the result of her visit.... More and more I am persuaded of the value of a woman's insight in the arranging for the welfare of workers." (8)

Christine Hanbury's case may well therefore have been an exception to the principle of 'selection for fitness' on the basis of her sex. It was much more typical in the inter-war period for the young men who were entering the brewery to serve a period of employment in some section of the industry in order to demonstrate their merit before being allowed to join the Board of Directors. J.C.M. Hanbury, for example, joined the company in 1931, being employed at the Burton brewery, but did not join the Board until 1933. M.A. Pryor worked for three years at the Ipswich Malting Company before joining the Burton brewery for a year and finally gaining his place on the Board in 1934. Membership of the Board thus implied at least some practical knowledge of some aspects of the working of the brewery. It also involved a commitment in terms of time; Thomas Fowell Buxton wrote to his mother from his accomodation over the brewery in 1808: "I was up this morning at four and do not expect to finish my

day's work before twelve tonight." (9) It may be that his successors did not exercise quite this degree of diligence, but many Buxtons and some Hanburys were to follow his example of resigning from their responsibilities at the brewery on election to political office, recognising that it was impossible to fulfill both commitments adequately at the same time.

The rules for Board membership established in 1898 had laid down that the maximum number of Directors was to be ten, but in reality this maximum was only rarely reached. Specific Directors would be assigned to specific functions, although in practice there would be a great deal of overlap of duties. This is indicated by the delineation of duties of the junior Directors that was drawn up in 1920. H.F. Buxton was to superintend any matters connected with the Bottling Stores, Works Department and the Cooperage. He was also to help J.H. Buxton in the management of the Country Trade. J.A. Pryor was the Burton Director, but was additionally to assist in the purchasing of materials for both Burton and London, attend to brewing matters and to the running of the Stables and to assist in the superintendence of the Bottling Stores and the Works Department. Geoffrey Dent, a Buxton through his mother, was to assist both H.F. Buxton and J.A. Pryor in the Works Department. He was also involved in checking the accounts. E.N. Buxton Junior was to assist both G. Buxton in the Clock Room, where much of the general

administrative work was conducted, and Geoffrey Dent in the checking of accounts. (10) In this way, all the Directors became expert in certain areas, but in the event of the absence or retirement of specific Directors, there would always be continuity of experience.

The decisions that the Board of Directors were involved in making were wide-ranging in their subject matter, encompassing every aspect of brewery life and welfare, ranging from the most essential to the most mundane. This was not an unusual phenomenon in British industry. Chandler has pointed out that in many of the family-controlled enterprises in the top two hundred company list, the owners were often absorbed in the daily operational activities that one would expect of middle management. (11) It is to a consideration of some of these diverse activities that attention will now be directed.

At Rest each year, when the year's accounts would be audited, there would be a series of meetings attended by all of the Directors in which the financial commitments faced by the brewery would be examined. This would include publican's rents and the cost of leases and loans to be made to properties owned by the brewery throughout the country. Such decisions were made on the basis of personal knowledge of the prevailing situation. Members of the Board would frequently travel to out of London sites to see what



was going on. One such trip was undertaken by J.A. Pryor in 1922 to Swansea, where rebuilding work had begun on the depot. In the course of his day trip he managed to visit the new store and ten public houses, and to gather a general picture of the economic state of the area as it was likely to impinge on the licensed trade. Within a fortnight of his return a memorandum outlining his conclusions was circulating amongst other Board members. (12) In the early 1920s the meetings at which such financial decisions would be taken could be fitted into the course of a single week, but by the early 1930s, the number of meetings had increased, and they took place over a period that could range from two weeks to two months. Part of the reason for this increase was the growing number of breweries and tied properties that the company was acquiring. This too, was the consequence of decisions reached at Board level. Thus, the last quarter of 1930 saw a flurry of activity by Board members. In a letter to Edward Buxton, John Buxton noted that: "I have been round the Writtle and Gravesend houses (the Gravesend with my father) and we both like the proposals and feel the properties would not need great expense in upkeep. We are now going into the costs of delivery direct from Brick Lane." (13) A week later, H.F. Buxton (John's father) was to write: "Geof (Dent) and I are seeing some of the Maldon properties tomorrow," (14) and on the same day the two of them had been to see Leslie

Tritton who was the company's Bank Manager, presumably to arrange the forthcoming debenture issue that would be used at least in part to finance the purchase of all three of these provincial breweries which would take place over the following twelve months. A further related function of the Board was to sanction the purchase of a wide range of materials and equipment. It is clear that the Burton Director would generally be involved directly in the choice and cost of materials, calling upon the advice and expertise of the Head Brewer to guide him. In terms of the purchase of equipment, the extent of the involvement by individual Directors is less clear. It seems more likely that in this instance much was left to the discretion of the General Manager.

The Board did however, concern itself very closely with the workings of the labour force. It was the Board that determined when it was appropriate to employ additional workers. Such an expansion was particularly marked in the early years of the century when the growth of the bottled beer trade required the employment of extra workers on the bottling machinery and as specialist brewers and sales staff. Similarly, in slack times it was the Board that took the decision whether to lay off workers. It was the Board too which determined the levels of wages to be paid. They were influenced in their decisions pertaining to wages by three factors. Firstly, the state of the trade: wages

had a tendency to fluctuate in response to this. Secondly, the levels of wages being paid by other breweries: thus in 1918, the company fixed its minimum wage at 43 shillings, in line with Whitbreads. (15) Thirdly, pressure from the workers and their representatives: thus in 1919, Gerald Buxton met the draymen and the women employed in the Bottling Store, when both of these groups felt they had a legitimate grievance against the company. The upshot of this meeting was that the Board "decided to grant an interview to the union officials with a view to mutual explanations and in the hope of satisfactory arrangements." (16) Within a week, a meeting with the Brewers' Workers Union had led to a satisfactory resolution of the grievances. Yet these three influences were not immutable factors in determining the conduct of the Board. They would try to stave off wage reductions for as long as possible; when Bass in Burton asked for unilateral action in the reduction of Maltsters' wages, they refused to discuss it as an isolated issue, preferring to defer the question for a four month period, (17) and when the Brewers' Workers Union had suggested an overtime rate of 1s 3d to resolve the draymen's dispute in 1919, the Board had responded with an offer of 1s 6d. (18) It is of course possible that their motive for this action was to undercut support for the union. Although such a motive is not explicitly stated, it is true that Trumans do

not in general appear to have been one of the better paying breweries to work for in the inter-war period. Evidence for this can be constructed from comparisons between the wage books of the brewery and information provided in the New Survey of London Life and Labour. For instance, the average wage rate indicated by the Ministry of Labour for a mechanical driver was seventy-four shillings per week, (19) whereas at Trumans it was seventy-three shillings. Even more usefully, the average rates of a London brewery in 1930 were provided. Employing forty-one coopers, the anonymous brewery's average rate in that department was 83s 9d. (20) By comparison, the thirty-one coopers at Trumans earned an average rate of seventy-five shillings.

It is true that such comparisons are fraught with problems; the exact nature of the workers used to arrive at the anonymous brewery's average rate is not stated. Nonetheless such statistical evidence does at least provide some support for the general perception that existed among some brewery workers who were engaged in conversation during this research that their wages were marginally lower than they could have earned elsewhere. Yet in spite of these relatively lower wages, whether they be real or imagined, there was generally a low rate of turnover in the workforce, with many men serving long periods of employment with the company. Part of the explanation for this phenomenon

may lie in the non-monetary remuneration which was offered to the workforce, which contributed to a sense of company loyalty. It is to a survey of the key elements of this and to an attempt to identify the management's motivations in engaging in such practices that the next chapter will be addressed.

### FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III

1. Directors' Minute Books, 21st April, 1898
2. Letter from Noel Buxton to Edwy, Correspondence Folder, GLC. It seems likely that this letter dates from some point in the period 1929 - 35 since all the letters that are dated in this folder fall between these two parameters.
3. Directors' Minute Books, 18th July, 1898
4. Black Eagle, July, 1929, 6
5. Letter from Noel Buxton to Edwy, loc. cit.
6. M. Anderson, Noel Buxton: a Life, London, 1952, p.27
7. Letter from Noel Buxton to Edwy, loc. cit.
8. E.D. Proud, Welfare Work, London, 1916, p.66
9. Quoted in Verily Anderson, Friends and Relations, London, 1980, p.290
10. Directors' Minute Books, 5th August, 1920
11. A. Chandler, Scale and Scope. The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, London, 1990, p.267
12. Monthly Reports, 1908 - 1938, 13th December, 1922
13. Letter from John Buxton to Edwy, 26th September, 1930, loc. cit.
14. Letter from H.F. Buxton to Edwy, 2nd October, 1930, loc. cit.
15. Directors' Minute Books, 18th April, 1918
16. Directors' Minute Books, 31st July, 1919
17. Directors' Minute Books, 10th September, 1931
18. Directors' Minute Books, 31st July, 1919

19. Cited in New Survey of London Life and Labour,  
volume V, London, 1933, p.86
20. ibid., p.87

#### CHAPTER IV - PATERNALISM, MANAGEMENT AND THE WORKFORCE

Melling (1) has argued that there are three distinct ways of approaching any study of welfare provision: an empirical approach would define welfare in terms of the range and content of the amenities provided; a purposive approach would examine the motives for the provision of the amenities and a functional approach would examine the objective functions that welfare fulfilled, irrespective of the motives that underlay its provisions. This enquiry proposes to take aspects of each of these approaches in order to reach conclusions about the nature of the welfare provision that was in operation at Trumans brewery in the inter-war years. In this chapter, a survey will be made of the key components of the welfare (ie non-monetary) provision that was on offer to the workforce. An attempt will be made to identify the motives of the management in creating or continuing these policies, although it is not always possible to achieve this, either because it was done without conscious intent or because that conscious intent was not explicitly articulated in the sources. However, as Melling points out, whatever the motives of the employers, whether they be conscious or not, welfare provision did fulfill certain objective functions. Therefore, an inherent part of this chapter will be to attempt to identify this functional impact.



Paternalism had characterised the conduct of the brewery's management from a very early point in its history; Thomas Fowell Buxton believed in "education as an indispensable means to freedom," (2) and so shortly after he had come to the brewery he hired a school master and told the brewery workforce that "this day six weeks I shall discharge every man who cannot read and write." (3) Legend has it that not a single man was sacked. Other aspects of paternalistic provision included an annual present since at least 1819, the establishment of a reading room and library, discretionary pensions and gratuities and the provision of some recreational facilities, amongst other things. As has already been indicated, the motives that underlay such practices were complex, encompassing a general desire to help others whilst simultaneously furthering the direct interests of the company. Thus, the provision of schools for the sons of workmen was philanthropic, but the fact that "the mental training is made subsidiary to the interests of the firm...and the lads who show the most talent and industry have the first offer of employment in the brewery" (4) served the economic interests of the firm. At all times, the care of the employee was tempered with reason; so that in 1825, one of the partners was led to comment: "Take especial care not to pension those men who have not been good men as it has a bad effect." (5)

It is clear that members of the Board were

conscious of this tradition of paternalism and committed to its maintenance. The undated letter from Noel Buxton to E.N. Buxton quoted in chapter III shows this, as does E.N. Buxton's own speech on Gerald Buxton's illness which had kept him away from the annual trip to Brighton in 1927: "The traditions he had tried to live up to, as he would admit were not his own inventions for he had received them from his father." (6) In view of their conscious emulation of the past, it seems likely that members of the families would have been aware of the benefits that could have been derived from the pursuit of such policies.

In any event, such practices were not unique to Trumans. Fitzgerald has shown that across the brewing trade, extensive use had been made of paternalistic devices throughout the nineteenth century as a mechanism for managing the labour force. In relatively small units of production personal links between the employer and the labour force were possible and these links could be reinforced by the effective use of gratuities made on an ex gratia basis. In other industries, as the scale of production increased during the course of the nineteenth century, such practices might be modified or cease altogether. In brewing, by comparison, the scale of production tended to increase merely as a function of amalgamation, rather than as a consequence of fundamental changes in the processes. Those who had dominated the industry in the nineteenth

century tended to continue to dominate it in the twentieth century too. Thus in many breweries, nineteenth century paternalistic practices persisted and even expanded in the early twentieth century. (7)

It seems probable that to the well-established paternalistic tradition that existed within Trumans was brought an awareness of the wide-ranging contemporary debate about methods of effective management. This debate had its origins in the early years of the century, with one of the leading group of participants being the Rowntrees. A similarity of outlook was shared by this family with their "Quaker conception of business as a trust" (8) and the Hanburys and Buxtons, as were social links. Briggs, for example, refers to a breakfast in 1912 shared by B.S. Rowntree and Charles Buxton. (9) Discussion of common points of interest arising from business would seem to have been highly likely. Indeed, interest in some of these issues seems to have reached Board level. On several occasions, references are made that suggest new ideas were being considered by the Board. In 1930, for example, Christine Hanbury went to New York to visit a number of American factories, and in the account of her visit that was published in the 'Black Eagle,' she makes it clear that she disapproves of the American approach to welfare work. She believed that this tended to treat each worker "as a bit of machinery - to be kept in good

repair because it pays, then scrapped." (10) Her views raise several important issues. Firstly, she was clearly aware of the implications of the American system, which implies some familiarity with the welfare work debate. Secondly, she implies that her view of the necessity for a system that maintains the physical efficiency of the workforce was derived from a more altruistic perspective than that of mere profitability. As this statement was made in the company magazine, it seems likely that this view was shared by other members of the Board. F.H. Jeacock, the Staff Manager, in addressing the London section of the Institute of Brewers in 1932 also showed himself conversant with current developments when he suggested that "it is being recognised that due consideration of, and for the worker is a sound business policy and not a mere economic fad.... It is a policy which gives a commercial return and is to the mutual advantage of employer and employee." (11) It seems unlikely that such a statement would have been made in such a public arena without at least the tacit support of the Board. This thus reinforces the view that some sort of debate about contemporary issues was going on at Board level.

What clearly needs to be analysed is firstly, the motives of management, which is clearly a difficult task both because of the complexity of those motives and the paucity of explicit written evidence relating to them. Further, such evidence as is available may

merely be a legitimation of other submerged motives and great caution needs to be exercised in its use. Secondly, an examination needs to be made of the extent to which non-monetary remuneration was a continuation of existing practice and the extent to which it marked a fundamental departure from traditional paternalistic practices. In order to achieve these two objectives, a brief survey of the main forms of the non-monetary rewards available to the workforce will be made.

The sports and social provision provided by the company expanded rapidly during the inter-war period. There had been some ad hoc provision for many years: the cricket team can be traced back to at least 1884, when annual matches against Whitbreads began; in 1909, part of the motor shed was partitioned off to provide a rifle range for the Rifle Club; in 1912, £5 was given by the Board to a group of men who were trying to form a football team; in 1916, a tennis court was built on the roof of Number 18, above the cellars. Increasingly systematic provision was made after the war with the advent of annual sports days from 1919, to which both the workforce and their families were invited. These events were held initially at the homes of members of the Board of Directors - in 1919 at Great West Hatch (J.M. Hanbury), in 1920 at Easneye (J.H. Buxton), and in 1921 at Birch Hall (Gerald Buxton). After this date the sports ground at Highams Park had been purchased and was used. The Directors acted as judges and

stewards and presented the prizes, but they did not participate in the races. Nonetheless, these occasions served to reinforce an image which had been successfully developed in the course of the nineteenth century of the company as a family with common interests and concerns shared by employers and employees alike. This perception is made explicit on a number of occasions. such as the report on a Sports Club dinner attended by both Directors and workers: "The atmosphere of a happy family prevailed throughout the evening." (12) This view of the company was not confined to in-house publications, but was also being presented in the local press. In a flattering report on the annual trip in 1927, reference was made to "this family concern - family in principles and family in employees." (13) The development of the image of the family was an inherent part of the process by which worker loyalty could be maintained for it promoted a sense of co-operation, of "duty, service and effort in a common cause." (14)

Such a creation of a family mythology appears to have been widespread among those who were engaged in paternalistic practices. As Waller points out in the Dukeries, the "domestic landmarks of the employers' families did not go unnoticed. Births and marriages were feted, the coming of age of sons was celebrated, the dynasty was rejuvenated and renewed." (15) In the pages of the 'Black Eagle', such celebration of key

events in the lives of the workforce might also be found, a further reinforcement of the notion that all who worked at the brewery were part of the same community. The extent to which this sense of the "family" was consciously exploited is impossible to judge. What is clear though is that it gave the company the opportunity to emphasise very clearly the common interests of all who were connected with it.

Although the provision of sports and social facilities was being actively promoted, initially the workforce's attitude to it was rather apathetic, perhaps because they were pursuing their leisure activities elsewhere. In 1923, only about one hundred employees belonged to the Sports Club. This figure had however risen to 567 by 1929, thereby comprising 95 per cent of the workforce. The most likely explanation for this expansion of interest was the opening of a licensed club room over the canteen at Brick Lane. This contained snooker, billiards, bagatelle, table-tennis, darts, dominoes and card games. It may well have been further reinforced by the purchase of a sports ground on which considerable amounts of money were spent for improvements: £1,000 for sundries in 1924, £2,500 for a sports pavilion in 1929 and the purchase of a charabanc for excursions in 1934. Inter and intra brewery competitions were organised at the sports ground, being made even more convivial by the provision of free drinks and sandwiches. Thus, the Sports Club expanded

for the perfectly sound reason that the employees derived a considerable amount of subsidised enjoyment from it. Its activities were further highlighted by the reporting of them in the pages of 'Black Eagle', which rose from a coverage of six pages in the first edition of 1929 to twenty-six pages by 1938.

That the Directors had motives other than the mere amusement of the labour force was implied in a number of ways. For example, in 1925, they instituted the Directors' Cup, a trophy for the department winning the highest number of points in various indoor and outdoor sports, with the avowed aim of encouraging a team spirit of co-operation, which they no doubt aspired to see carried over into the workplace. In the pages of 'Black Eagle' are to be found a variety of remarks which clearly reflect the best hopes of the Directors. These include: "a man who works hard and plays hard is usually a type to encourage," (16) or "a good sports club...is the best means...for fitting us to do our job in life with greater efficiency." (17) What seems clear is that there was a convergence of interests that proved to be of benefit to both sides to pursue insofar as both appeared to successfully achieve separate objectives. For the employers, it increased worker loyalty and efficiency because it encouraged co-operation. At the same time, it contributed to the fulfillment of their perception of the duties of management vis-a-vis their workforce. For the workers,



it provided opportunities for organised leisure pursuits.

As has already been indicated, further opportunities both for recreation and the promotion of the family image were provided by the annual excursion. This had begun as far back as 1851, possibly with a trip to the Great Exhibition in that year. Such "bean feasts" had continued uninterrupted through to 1914, and had been a typical element in the armoury of many paternalistic employers offering as they did both a clear demonstration of their concern for the enjoyment of the workforce and an opportunity to reinforce the image of the company as a family as employers and employees sat down to eat their tea together. Joyce has demonstrated the use of such strategies by the cotton manufacturers of the nineteenth century. By implementing devices such as these they were able to emphasise the degree of "co-operation and the recognition of mutual interests" (18) that they wished to suggest pertained in the workplace. This led to the workforce identifying their employers' actions as being determined by the interests of all those that were involved in the company.

Paternalistic strategies in the cotton industry declined from the 1890s, but they continued in the brewing industry unabated. Indeed, where many firms did not revive the tradition of the "bean feast" after the war, having begun with a trip to Southend in 1919 just

for the men, Trumans made it a more-or-less annual event, and extended it to the women and families. The only exceptions were the years when trade was particularly bad at the start of the 1930s. The precise motives of the management in resurrecting this tradition are not clear; it is true that it could certainly continue to fulfill its pre-war functions, and every opportunity was taken at these events to extol the virtues of the employers and the company, which it may have been felt were likely to increase the sense of loyalty that bound the workforce to the company, but nowhere are such attitudes explicitly expressed. A further motive may have been related to free advertising as each year's excursion was reported in a full page article in the City and East London Observer. What is clear, is that the majority of employees took advantage of the excursion, although it is impossible to draw any conclusions about their views on the speeches which addressed the issues of loyalty and co-operation.

Company pensions and gratuities had been granted since the early nineteenth century, but had never been given as of right, merely at the discretion of the Board. In general, the granting of a pension was related to three criteria: the age of the applicant, the length of service (if this was deemed to be insufficient, a gift rather than a pension was likely to be conferred) and personal circumstances - a worker

in receipt of state old age pension or a trade superannuation, for example, would receive a reduced company pension. It was common practice among brewery companies to use their pension schemes to restrict organisation amongst their labour force; Watneys, for example, by granting pensions only to those with continuous service could deny them to any worker who at any point in his service had been on strike, whilst Friary, Holroyd and Healey's granted them only to non-union members. (19) Such a system, where "the provision assumes the form of a bounty bestowed upon a deserving worker by a considerate superior" (20) had come under attack and some commentators were arguing for a situation where the worker knew with certainty and in advance that his old age would be provided for.

Trumans do not appear to have employed their system of pensions for such overt methods of labour control as these other breweries, but it is apparant that they did wish to retain the more traditional, and indeed, the more deferential approach to the granting of pensions. As H.F. Buxton informed the workforce at the annual outing in 1927, £60,000 had been put away over the previous three years in order to secure pensions, both past and future, but "this does not alter our system of pensions in any way, it is still entirely at the discretion of the Directors when and how much any one shall receive." (21) Whilst such a strategy could have increased worker resentments, its

apparent results seem to have been to have contributed to an increased worker loyalty. The likely reason for this was, as Hannah has suggested, that "where the tradition (of granting discretionary pensions) was particularly well developed, the employer, though he had discretion in individual cases, could no more have generally and unilaterally stopped such pensions than he could have ceased contributing to the local church and reading room." (22) He argues that such pensions were part of a system of reciprocal relations and were recognised on all sides as such. Such an understanding on the part of the workforce goes some way to explain why the son of Rayner Wesley was able to write on his father's death that "We do not forget but that his years were lengthened by the fact that through the kindness and generous help of the Brewery, he was spared from any sort of financial worry." (23) Through such a promotion of worker loyalty, turnover would be minimised, ensuring a continuity of experienced workers.

Thus, the policy itself had beneficial results, but the fact that it was implemented in this particular way gives rise to a range of interpretations about the management. It could be taken to suggest that although members of the Board were cognisant of the current debate on welfare work, they had not assimilated all its implications. It could be argued that their approach to this issue was rooted in nineteenth century

have an appeal to any management that was concerned with the efficiency of its workforce. Despite this, when in 1900 Gerald Buxton made the suggestion that some aid should be given to support the Association's work, the idea was initially rejected because of the fact that it was actuarially unsound. It was not until 1906 that help was given, contingent on a "reduction of the sick pay and an alteration of one or two of the rules affecting payment at death of members and their wives." (25) The draymen were not part of the Black Eagle Mutual Association for they had their own organisation, the Draymen's Mutual Association, membership of which was compulsory. They also had their own pension scheme and accident fund. This was the consequence of the nature of the work they were engaged in, which made it likely that they would not be able to continue working for what was considered as the normal time span for work. In order both to ensure their loyalty in their limited working life and to limit cost of pensions and gratuities to this group, arrangements such as this were necessary. All these separate provisions disappeared in the aftermath of the war, presumably both because of the changing nature of their work, with the growing importance of mechanised transport, and because of changes in the government's national insurance schemes. The third area of self-help that existed was the Savings Bank, in which any member of the company, past or present could deposit money at

a return of three per cent. It was underwritten by the company to ensure its continuing operation. By 1927, deposits with it amounted to £27,000 with its customers including ninety-one workmen, forty-three members of staff, twenty Directors and their families and a wide variety of company-linked organisations, such as the Sports Club, the Library Association and the Black eagle Mutual Association.

The provision of such self-help facilities obviously harked back to the nineteenth century liberal ideology which the families had supported. Their continued existence cost the company very little in terms of money, but would have fulfilled obligations of duty, whilst having the potential to act favourably upon efficiency and upon the sense of a family in which all members were concerned about other members. Such a sense was not confined to Trumans. It is also evident in the writings of Cadbury. "It has been thought advisable to encourage saving among the workers, notwithstanding the fact that there are ample provisions publicly made to promote thrift." (26)

In terms of health provision, particularly in view of the prevailing debate about the efficiency of the workforce and the involvement of both Buxtons and Hanburys as governors of the London Hospital, remarkably little was done. Periodically, the Board of Directors would ask the public vaccinator to attend the brewery and would arrange for a nurse from the London

Hospital to be there afterwards to dress arms and give advice, and should anyone have to take time off as a consequence of their vaccination they were entitled to full pay. Until 1928, Gerald Buxton had personally met the costs of the convalescence of any company employee whom the Company Doctor had indicated required this facility; in that year, the company took over the responsibility for meeting this payment. Until 1935, when an Ambulance Room was provided, the only other medical facility offered to the employees was an examination by the Company Doctor after they had been employed for six months in order to check up on their physical fitness for the work they were engaged upon. If there were any doubts, they were unlikely to be sacked on the spot, but would be required to have a further examination six months later. Despite the lack of medical provision made directly by the company, they did not object to the workforce organising their own care. This reinforces earlier remarks about self-help. In 1923, branch E6 of the Hospital Savings Association came into existence at Brick Lane. In return for a weekly subscription of threepence the member or any member of his immediate family would receive a voucher which would enable them to obtain hospital, dental, optical or convalescent treatment. At the outset of the scheme, 486 employees joined, comprising the vast majority of the workforce. From this point, it becomes hard to keep track of the membership as people leaving

the brewery, either through retirement or to work elsewhere, would keep on their membership of this branch. The Directors paid the contributions of all pensioners, which was not as altruistic as it might appear to be at first glance. In the event of a pensioner falling ill, he would generally apply to the Board for a gratuity, and he would also generally receive it. Thus, in much the same way as the workforce used the scheme as a system of insurance against sickness, so too did the Directors.

Annual presents had been granted at Rest since at least 1819, being determined on the basis of length of service, record of attendance over the preceding year and general attitude to work in the previous twelve months. In 1925, a more systematic method of payment known as the Shareholders' bonus was introduced. It was more systematic in the sense that a given scale of rates was set down; in the first five years of its operation, for example, it comprised of an additional week's salary. It therefore compares favourably with the pensions and gratuities in that it was clearly defined, although all or part of it could be withheld from persistent latecomers. Nonetheless, its existence does suggest that in some areas the management was moving forward in the practices that it engaged in, although it served clear functions for them. Firstly, because all or part of it could be denied, it served as a disincentive to idleness. Secondly, it could act in a



less clearly measurable way as an incentive to harder work, for the amount of the bonus could be varied from year to year according to the profits that were made. When announcing the 1935 bonus, which was lower than it had been in previous years, the Chairman remarked that "I am hoping that the ensuing year with your loyal support - I will repeat that - with your loyal support, we shall be able to increase it." (27) In this way the bonus tended to reinforce the feeling that employer and employee had a common interest which would best be served through co-operation rather than through conflict. Yet to suggest exclusively profit-related motives would not be to tell the whole story. In 1929, for instance, which was a particularly bad year for the brewing industry, one shareholder telegraphed the Chairman: "Damn the dividend and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Employees and staff must come first!", (28) insisting that the bonus should be paid out, as indeed it was, and at the previous year's level. Such an attitude typified much of what went on in the company; there were often sound business reasons for a given course of action, but there was also an underlying concern about the condition of the workforce inherited from the traditions of the nineteenth century. As Emden has suggested "they (Quaker employers) never lost sight of the human factor...and that success is not necessarily achieved at the expense of others." (29) That is not to suggest that only Quaker employers were

introducing profit-sharing schemes, for they were part of the armoury of the welfare work movement. What is clear though, is that for companies like Trumans, there were many forces that were operating upon management leading them to employ the strategies that they did.

The only entirely new innovation that was made by the management in the inter-war years was the establishment of a Works Committee along the lines of many others that were being introduced in this period. The idea seems to have been floated initially as a consequence of discussions that were taking place among the London brewers in 1920, but nothing very tangible arose directly from this. According to the Directors' minutes, the real impetus came from a group of workers "who were wishful to appoint a representative committee to confer with the Directors from time to time on matters affecting their mutual interest." (30) There was no suggestion by the Directors that this group represented any organised trade union. After this representation, the Board considered the request and decided to establish a Works Committee on lines laid down by them. Each department would have two representatives on the Committee, whose main areas of responsibilities were to include the organisation of collections for men who had been away sick for more than three months through sickness or accident, the direction of canteen facilities and the organisation of trips to other factories. It might, by arrangement, or

at the request of the Board of Directors, discuss other matters, such as holidays, insurance schemes and short time working. It was expressly forbidden any discussion of wages or of the management of the company.

The fact that the Works Committee therefore had no real power to discuss things that might have been of direct concern to the workforce seems to have been tacitly recognised on all sides. In April, 1924, there was only one nomination for a vacancy on the Committee and this general lack of interest was further emphasised in May 1927 when the Secretary of the Committee sent a letter to the Board of Directors complaining of the irregular attendance by some members. It therefore seems unlikely that the Works Committee was achieving what the original group of workers had hoped and expected of it in terms of acting as an intermediary between the employers and the workforce. Various problems apparently persisted, as in March 1928, the Directors reconstituted the organisation of the Committee. It now comprised of one representative from each department, together with the addition of one foreman and one head of department. It seems likely that these latter two were included in order to ensure attendance. The decision by the Board to attempt to reform the Committee rather than to abandon it seems to suggest that they had hijacked the idea for their own purposes. Indeed, the reports of its

meetings that were carried in the in-house magazine that was first produced at the behest of the Works Committee in 1929 suggest that it had merely become the mouthpiece of the management. Thus, a fairly typical response to the Directors' proposal to increase insurance in 1930 was that "whatever the decision of the Directors is, it will be such as to leave us no cause for complaint." (31)

In the United States of America during the 1920s, the evidence suggests that strategies such as profit-sharing and the establishment of Works Committees were being explicitly used by employers as a means of holding down wage rises whilst simultaneously increasing productivity and as a way of resisting trade union pressures for changes. (32) There is no direct evidence that Trumans utilised such strategies for these purposes. It is however clear that the management of the brewery saw the continuation of a wide variety of existing paternalistic practices to be in their best interests as employers. By suggesting the community of interest that existed, they could create a sense of co-operation rather than of conflict between employer and employed, and show the workforce that by their involvement in this system they too would share in the benefits: "Mr. H.F. Buxton...was sure that nobody would drink to the health of the firm without enthusiasm for they were all bound up in it. Its prosperity was dependent on what the Directors were able to do for the

men and what the employees were able to give in return." (33) By thus promoting a sense of loyalty among their workers, the management was contributing to the creation of a strong internal labour market that was likely to help it to enhance its profitability.

Although the management did not explicitly make any reference to the role of trade unionism in the brewery, many of its strategies could be interpreted as mechanisms for undermining any potential support for organised labour. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, trade unionism in the brewing industry was weak. Labour problems were resolved within the firm and would not be discussed by the brewers' associations. Thus, as Fitzgerald has pointed out: "the influence of employers and their discretionary benefits over the attitudes and actions of their workers" was increased. (34) It has been indicated that for some brewers, pension schemes could be used as a method of preventing union membership. The same could be said for profit-sharing schemes. Bowie wrote in 1922, for example, that "the bitterest present day antagonism is between worker and employer...profit-sharing schemes arise in proportion to the acuteness of the question." (35) It is certainly the case that Russell and Wrangham introduced profit-sharing in 1911 in response to a threat of a strike. (36) Works Committees could be seen as a further means of undermining the role of trade unions and collective bargaining. In a broad sense,

there is no apparant difference between the practices that prevailed at Trumans and those in existence at other breweries. An extensive study of the Directors' minutes does not reveal their motives or their views on the issue of trade unionism, presumably because these were so well understood by all those present. Rubinstein suggests that "rich liberal brewers were virtually unheard of after 1886," (37) yet not only did Hanburys and Buxtons remain liberal, but some made the move to the Labour Party, so no easy conclusions are possible.

Moreover, the analysis to this point has ignored the potential existence of a more altruistic dimension. The inter-war period saw an attempt by Quaker employers to rationalise the fundamental conflict that arose for them by participating in industry. At the 1918 Conference of Quaker Employers, it was argued that "our true status and function in society is the true spirit which regards industry as a national service to be carried on for the benefit of the community," (38) an idea which was echoed in 1937 by B.S. Rowntree: "whatever may be the motive which induces us to engage in industry, the real purpose of industry is communal service." (39) Such a striving to reconcile industry and religion was also apparent to Noel Buxton's biographer, as has already been suggested. (40) One could, of course, argue that all this was merely a legitimisation of the status quo, but this would be to

disregard the very real concerns that were experienced by the management. They wanted to maintain the profitability of the company which was the basis of their wealth. In the late nineteenth century, two of the lesser figures in the dynasties (John Henry Buxton and Robert Hanbury) were recorded as half millionaires. (41) It therefore seems likely that at least some of the twelve London millionaires would have come from within the company. Simultaneously, that wealth had engendered a sense of duty in members of the families so that many of them were impelled to pursue a variety of philanthropic and political careers. For those that worked in the brewery, that sense of moral obligation and duty were no less.

What is clear is that in spite of the contemporary debates about the nature of management, and indeed, in spite of the fact that the Directors were aware of at least some parts of that debate, they did not really utilise any of these prevailing ideas. There are no indications that the Directors would have had much sympathy with Cadbury's view that whilst co-operation between employer and employee could be fostered in order to improve business efficiency, this should not be done at the expense of "the loyalty of the worker to his own class and organisation." (42) Trumans continued to exercise the paternalistic attitudes and practices that would have been entirely familiar to their predecessors with no really

significant adaptations to meet the changing circumstances of the early twentieth century. They were prepared to listen to the respectful requests of the workforce, but in no sense to treat them as equals. In some respects what was on offer was authoritarian, implying the existence of a deferential relationship between employer and employee, which harked back to the practices of the early nineteenth century. There were elements though that were voluntary and these seem, at least in the longer term, to have been well supported by the workforce, suggesting that they were complaisant in what was being offered to them. At Trumans, the only surviving records all reiterate the theme of respect for the employers. It seems unlikely that this was the case on all occasions, but it nonetheless seems probable that on balance, the workforce would have shared the feelings expressed by the brewery workers of Carlisle after the effective nationalisation of brewing in that area: "for some time past they have been making unfavourable comparisons between the interest which the private employer took in the old workers and the indifference with which the Government treats them."

(43)

In the course of this chapter an attempt has been made to identify the range of provision of non-monetary remuneration and to examine the extent to which paternalism determined this provision. Such a survey fulfills Melling's empirical and purportive approaches.



In terms of his functional view of welfare provision, Trumans policies limited the influence of trade unions and created a consensual environment in which the workforce closely identified their interests with those of the company. This enabled the company to operate effectively and efficiently in the market conditions that prevailed, thus maximising its profitability.

#### FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IV

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## CHAPTER V - WORK OF EMPLOYED MANAGEMENT

Chandler has identified three broad categories of managerial control within British industry in the first half of the twentieth century. (1) Firstly, there were those which he classified as personal enterprises, which were administered without the benefit of an extensive managerial hierarchy. Secondly, there were those which he termed 'entrepreneurial' or family controlled, where the founder or the founder's heirs recruited management hierarchies while continuing to be influential stockholders and senior executives. Finally, there were those companies in which there were few links between the founders and those who managed the company. In order to reach this conclusion, Chandler studied a number of specific companies. His findings with regard to family firms suggest that Trumans was typical of many firms operating within the branded, packaged product and brewing trades at this time.

It was the Board of Directors which took all executive decisions pertaining to the running of the company and individual members often concerned themselves with some of the most mundane aspects of the company's administration, so that they frequently operated at middle management level. There was additionally a hierarchy of employed clerical and managerial staff to support them. Typically, this would mean that "each department was managed by one or more

partners, usually from the founding family or families, together with a salaried specialist in the departmental function, such as Head Brewer, Head Clerk or Head of Malt and Maltings." (2) It is to an examination of the most senior levels of the paid administration that attention will now be directed. This will involve surveying the main responsibilities of three discrete elements, namely the General Manager, the Works Manager and the Heads of Departments.

The senior managerial post was that of General Manager. The importance of this in the company hierarchy can be gauged from the fact that the incumbent earned more than the fee paid to the highest paid Director; for instance, in 1913 the General Manager earned £2,500, while in the following year, the highest paid Director was earning £1,550. Indeed, the General Manager's assistant, on a wage of £1,300 in 1914 was earning exactly the same amount as the second highest paid Director. (3) In the inter-war period, the post was held successively by T.F. Reeve, until ill health forced his retirement at the age of eighty in 1919, George King until 1929 and finally H. Mallen. These three men had a number of characteristics in common. All had worked for the company from an early age; Reeve had joined at fourteen and King at seventeen. Mallen's career is less easy to track as he was employed at Burton until 1929, and presumably that was where the records pertaining to that part of his

employment were lodged. However, in view of the fact that he was employed by the company for a total of sixty-six years, he too must have started work for Trumans in his teens. All had worked for Trumans for more than thirty years before their elevation to this post and had worked their way through a variety of more junior posts. This can be illustrated by charting King's career:

**Table I - Time line to show the main developments in George King's career**

Year	Position held	Annual salary (where available)
1876	Junior clerk in the Counting House	£70
1880	Temporary help at Burton (where Reeve was Manager at the time)	£100
1881	Clerk in the Counting House	£110
1885	Abraod Clerk	£200
1886	Assistant to the Head of Beershop	£300
1890	Eastern Collector	£365
1891	Eastern Abroad Clerk	-
1912	Reeves' assistant (taking over an increasing amount of Reeves' work due to his ill health	£1,000
1919	General Manager	£2,500

(4)  
The background of all three of these men, and indeed, of the vast majority of the paid management, illustrates the nature of the 'gentlemen and players' split that was identified by Chandler. (5) To sit on the Board, one had to be a member of one of the

families, and the likely background would be a university education followed by a period of practical experience at either Brick Lane or Burton. Middle management would be drawn from men who might have received a practical training through a professional society or exceptionally through university and who additionally would have served a long period of on-the-job training with the company. Their loyalty to the company was therefore assured, and although they were merely 'players' the 'gentlemen' could expect them to emulate their attitudes.

The main functions of the General manager were on the financial and capital side of the brewing process. Thus, it was the General Manager of the day, Alexander Fraser, who was responsible for negotiating the purchase of the Burton brewery in the 1870s and the dissolution of the partnership together with the flotation of the company in the 1880s. That the General Manager had a fair degree of discretion in such matters is implied by H.F. Buxton in a letter to E.N. Buxton when the purchase of the Maldon brewery was being contemplated. Whilst a group of Directors, together with the Works Manager went to look at the properties and the brewery, Mallen was involved in a discussion with Collins. (6) The context of the letter suggests that Collins was either the person responsible for the sale of the Maldon brewery or a representative of the company's bank. In either case, Mallen's private



consultation with such a person is a good indicator of the degree of autonomy that the General Manager had.

It was the General Manager who was responsible for ensuring that at all times there were adequate supplies in stock and on order to enable production to continue uninterrupted. He also had to be fully conversant with all legislation and regulations pertaining to the industry and ensure that these were complied with. In order to facilitate this, he would on occasions represent the company in discussions with other breweries. In 1909, for example, it was T.F. Reeve who represented Trumans at a meeting of the seven main London brewers, where other breweries were represented by members of their Boards of Directors. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the state of the trade in London and to propose solutions to its problems. In the event, no firm decisions were taken, but Reeve's very presence at the meeting is a further indicator of the degree of autonomy he had.

Although the foregoing marks the real extent of the responsibilities of the General Manager, if they needed to act in other areas, it is clear that they did so. Thus, in 1911, when draymen arriving for work at 5am decided to go on strike, on their return at 11am to see members of the Board of Directors about their grievances, it was Reeve, rather than one of the three young and inexperienced Board members who were on site who spoke to them. He got them to return to work at

that time by promising that when more Directors were on site, their grievances would be examined. The fact that the men were prepared to return to work on the basis of this promise indicates that they believed that Reeve would keep his word, as indeed he did. (7)

It is apparant that the General Manager had a close working relationship with members of the Board of Directors. At the age of eighty-seven, Reeve was receiving letters from the the Chairman of the company and making suggestions to him about ways of altering the structure of shareholders. (8) In the Correspondence Folder at the LCC, which contains almost exclusively family material, is to be found one funeral card - that of T.F. Reeve. It was a former General Manager also who became the first person outside of the three families to sit on the Board, although H. Mallen did not achieve this until 1954. Yet one should not assume from this that the General Manager was all-powerful. In 1926, King's nephew, Cecil applied for a post as a junior clerk. It might seem that his appointment, particularly as his father had also been employed at the brewery as Storehouse Manager, would have been a foregone conclusion. Of course, it is equally possible, that the management might have been sensitive to potential charges of nepotism. On this occasion at any rate, Cecil King was not employed by the Staff Director responsible for the appointment, H.F. Buxton, although he was employed by the company at

a subsequent attempt.

The managerial position that had the main responsibility for personnel was the Works Manager. For the vast majority of the inter-war period (1921 - 1947) this position was held by F.H. Jeacock. He had first been employed in the brewery in April 1897 in the Works Office, having been introduced there by J.M. Hanbury "who had observed the young engineer's ability in his native county of Warwickshire," (9) where he had worked for Kibler and Company, a building firm, until the age of twenty-three. By 1900, he had been made up the position of Second Engineer and the comments in the wages book suggest that a very high opinion was held of his abilities, so that by 1907 he had advanced to the post of Engineer. There is a gap in his appearance in the records between 1907 and 1920, but when he reappears in 1920 it is as Assistant Manager at a salary of £2,500 per annum, a considerable rise from his last appearance in 1907 when he was earning £350 per annum. In 1921, he took on the post of Works Manager, which in addition to running the Works Department, involved brewery-wide responsibilities.

As has already been indicated, he was involved very much more directly with the personnel side of management than was the General Manager. His responsibilities included arranging for the appointment of new employees and the promotion of existing employees on the shop floor. After employees had been

medically examined at the end of their first six months of employment, it would be Jeacock, generally in consultation with a member of the Board, who would make the decisions in marginal cases. In December 1926, for example, it was Jeacock and H.F. Buxton who decided not to employ a marginal candidate, whilst in 1936, with J.A. Pryor and James Stenhouse, the Head Brewer, it was decided that a brewer who was seeking early retirement on medical grounds was not as unhealthy as he himself believed and so should be told to stay. (10) With the co-operation of the foremen he supervised the work that went on; he was involved in early forms of time and motion study in order to maximise output and hence profitability; he kept a check on illness and accidents so that information could be passed on to members of the Board of Directors on the basis of which they could make their decisions as to pensions and gratuities; he occasionally examined the various methods of wage payment which were in operation at the brewery (hourly, weekly and piece rate), in order to ensure that the most effective method in any given situation was in use. This would be judged both on the basis of cost efficiency and the general satisfaction of the labour force. Thus, in 1920, the piece rate element of the draymen's wages was replaced by a flat rate overtime payment at their request, although this later reverted to the piece rate payment, again at their request.

Generally, the Works Manager was prepared to take

advice from anyone who was competent to have an opinion, so for example, in 1911, he had attended a meeting of the Engineers' Society in order to discuss the prevailing rates of pay. (11) In the final analysis though, he appreciated that he had to distill the various views he heard expressed and present recommendations to the Board for their consideration. In his own words, "after discussion, the Works Manager must be in a position to give a report to his Directors based on all points that have been under discussion, and obtain from them a decision." (12) This suggests that the ultimate responsibility for making decisions lay with the Board, although they were likely to be influenced by him, particularly in view of his long experience with the company. He also acted as an intermediary between the Board of Directors and the Heads of Departments in relaying information about the decisions that had been made by the Board. Each Head of Department kept what was called the Directors' Order Book into which memoranda that affected all employees together with those which affected only those who worked in their department were stuck. In virtually every case, these memoranda were not signed by a Board member, but by Jeacock.

These Directors' Order Books contained not merely the decisions of the Board relating to such issues as wages, holidays, sick pay and general regulations concerning the running of the brewery, but also any

legislative issues that impinged on the workforce. They were thus a valuable aid to the third element of management in pursuing the policies that had been laid down by both the Government and the Board. There were five main Heads of Department, although their relative importance varied and was reflected in different salary structures. In 1923, the Board had decided that it would be useful to have monthly meetings of the Heads of Departments at which Jeacock would also be present. In this way matters of common concern could be discussed and appropriate solutions could be suggested. Jeacock would then be responsible for reporting back to the Board what had gone at these meetings, and they, in their turn could take any necessary decisions. It appears that this system worked reasonably well, as is indicated by the following memorandum attached to one of the Directors' Order Books: "The attached report on wages to be paid to men as agreed by Stenhouse, Smith, Inman, Marsden, Critchley and F.H. Jeacock was presented to the Board on December 13th 1933 and the proposals therein agreed to." (13) In spite of the influence that this group had with the Board, there were nonetheless limits to what they could do. Just as they supervised what went on in their departments, so the Board supervised their work, which included a directive issued in 1939 that their group lunches should end no later than 2.15pm. (14)

The most important of the Heads of Department was

the Head Brewer. This post was held from 1904 to 1938 by James Stenhouse. He had been educated at Watson College, Edinburgh, trained at the Central Institute, South Kensington and employed by W.J. Rogers of Bristol and Flowers and Sons of Stratford before joining Trumans as the Second Brewer at Burton in 1897, from which post he progressed to Burton Head Brewer in 1900 and London Head Brewer in 1904. His individual responsibilities in this post included supervising the brew and if there were any problems in any of the resulting gyles (brews), discerning the causes of them. In order to facilitate these functions, he lived in company property adjacent to Brick Lane. He was also involved in decisions regarding changes to the amounts of raw materials or gravity of the beer, both of which would alter the taste. Thus, he was included in a one and a half hour meeting along with a brewing expert and three Directors in an attempt to come up with a taste that would have an appeal in the East End of London at a time when consumption in that area was on the decline. (15) He would also be a party to any decisions regarding the purchase of additional breweries, and for that reason accompanied the Directors who visited the Maldon brewery in 1930. Periodically, he would meet with the Head Brewers of other breweries in order to make sure that any common problems might be resolved through common solutions, as for instance, in the case of discussing the level of wages that should be offered

throughout London to brewers. (16) This was a particularly pressing problem at this point because the advent of war had "cheated (brewers) of one of their best weapons of defence, namely, the right to employ other men in place of those who decide to go on strike." (17) This had led to increased union strength, a development that was not especially welcome to the majority of brewers. The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the industry had been put under the control of the Central Control Board in June 1915. It seems likely therefore that the brewery owners felt that they were being assailed from all sides, and that this was merely one response amongst many. Finally, it seems likely that in an indirect way, the Board of Directors would have seen Stenhouse as acting as an ambassador for the good name of the brewery - amongst the many external positions he held, with both the approval and the support of the Board, were President of the Institute of Brewing, Chairman of the Research Fund of the Brewers' Institute, member of the Consultative Committee for the Fermentation Industries and member of the Board of Management of the British School of Malting and Brewing at Birmingham University.

One of the most important trends in the brewing industry in the inter-war years was the massive expansion in the production of bottled beer. At Trumans, as at other breweries, the consequence of this expansion was to have important effects within the



brewery. It led firstly to a growth in the number of people employed in that department: from 98 in 1920 to 429 in 1936. In order to accomodate this expansion a building programme had to be undertaken; bottling had begun in a small way at Coverley Fields, a site about a quarter of a mile away from the main brewery, but the expansion in production soon led to the purchase of additional depots around the country and the centralisation of production on the Brick Lane site had occurred by 1913. In order to bottle efficiently, new machinery had to be purchased, thus involving the company in an important capital expenditure. The changes that were taking place in the bottling processes were reflected in the changes that took place in its management.

When D.L. Donald was promoted to the Head of Bottling in 1898, he had overall control, but as the work began to expand, so it was decided to split the areas of responsibility into two elements. Donald continued to have overall control, but was specifically responsible for sales; he organised the visits that were made into the trade, ensured that adequate supplies of beer were available at all times for bottling, arranged for the delivery of bottled beer to the depots and for the return of empty bottles to Brick Lane. To supervise the actual daily working of the factory floor, F.L. Browne was promoted. Donald retired in 1924 and there is no record of who replaced him.

Browne continued in his position of Bottling Stores Factory Manager until 1932, when he was promoted to the position that had been held by Donald prior to 1924. In his place, F.J. Critchley was appointed. It is clear from the relative salaries earned by the two positions that the Head of Bottling was the more important, but no indications are given about the way in which the two posts interacted in terms of a chain of management command.

The other three Heads of Department were J.V. Inman at the Storehouse from 1919 until at least 1936, W. Marsden at the Cooperage from 1920 until at least 1936 and W.T. Smith at the Beershop from 1920 until 1938. Of these three, the first two were of considerably less significance, as is reflected in their remuneration, indicated in table II. Smith, in addition to his post was also Second Brewer, which meant that he had to substitute for Stenhouse whenever required. There are virtually no references to the work that these three men did and one can only assume that in common with the other two Department Heads, they were responsible for keeping the relevant Director informed about what was going on, that they organised the day-to-day running of their department and made the necessary decisions regarding both the ordering of raw materials, stock or equipment and the work carried out by the labour force, subject of course, to the orders that had been transmitted to them from the Board of

**Table II - Wages of Heads of Department 1920 - 1936**

Name	1920	1930	1936
Stenhouse	£2,200	£2,750	£3000
Donald	£1,200	Retired	
Browne	£850	£1,250	£1,250
Critchley	Working in brewery as clerk		£800
Inman	£800	£820	£820
Marsden	£850	£820	£820
Smith	£700	£1,300	£1,650

(18)

Directors via Jeacock. There were further small departments such as the Wharf, but the Heads of these Departments were not involved in any significant way in the management of the brewery beyond their role within their own departments.

It is clear that the Board of Directors was a working Board that took a direct interest in the running of the brewery. There is much evidence that Board members were frequently on the premises. The Monthly Reports show that F.L. Browne had to meet the Director with responsibility for Bottling every morning, and it seems likely that this was a practice that was replicated in other departments. On the death of J.M. Hanbury, his unexpired season ticket from Chelmsford to London was returned to the Great Eastern Railway Company with the request that it should be re-issued in the name of his widow, Christine. (19) That both of these Hanbury Board members regarded it as

worthwhile to invest in a season ticket suggests very regular attendance at the brewery. Similarly, the instruction that the flow in the gas tank of Number 18 cellar could not be altered "without the sanction of Mr. Dent or Mr. Peter Pryor" (20) implies that at least one of them was always available.

The Board addressed itself to a wide range of matters which encompassed every aspect of life within the brewery, and for many of their employees touched on their domestic lives too. This ranged from significant decisions, such as the terms of agreements to be made with trade unions on the question of minimum wages in April 1920 or the setting aside of a large amount of money for the pension fund in December 1926 through what might be regarded as middle management decision making, such as the need to engage a new chemist in February 1930 or for all public house signposts to be varnished in November 1930, through to the most trivial matters such as donating five shillings to the Indigent Blind Fund of 1930. (21) As Payne has pointed out, "in brewing, the perpetuation of family control remained a major desideratum," (22) and this can clearly be seen in the way in which the Trumans' Board concerned itself with all aspects of the running of the brewery. It was this concern with the minutiae of the business that characterises the authoritarian paternalism that is associated with many breweries, including Trumans.

Thus, as in many other British companies that

were dominated by family management, "senior executives worked closely in the same office building, having almost daily personal contact with, and thus directly supervising, middle and often lower level managers."


(23) Although decision-making was the prerogative of the Directors, they were dependent on the expertise of those whom they employed; they were prepared to listen to reasoned argument and if they felt unable to make immediate decisions, they would defer judgement until they had approached a number of experts and sought their advice. That the ultimate decisions were theirs is evident, as is the fact that they did involve themselves in the daily routine running of the company. They set down guidelines for their senior management to operate within, but as long as those guidelines were adhered to, they allowed some autonomy of action. They seem also to have been conscious of the need to make explicit the status of their managers; when Browne was promoted to Head of the Bottling Factory, the Monthly Reports noted that "all instructions to be given by him, (24) presumably because the division of the Department had made the limits of responsibility for each manager unclear.

Both the General Manager and the Works Manager would be involved in discussions relating to their area of competence with either the relevant individual member of the Board or with the Board as a body. The Works Manager would act as an intermediary between the

Board and the Heads of Departments when both were acting as a body, but individual Heads of Departments had direct dealings with the individual Directors who had specific responsibility for their area and were likely to meet them on a regular basis, and in at least one case, on a daily basis. Beyond this, it is difficult to reconstruct the exact relationships that existed within the chain of the management hierarchy. Although there is abundant surviving material on the decisions that were made and the work that was carried out by various members of the Board and paid management, it is clear that much of what went on was the continuance of existing practice, and as such, there was little need to make explicit what it involved. As Chandler points out on several occasions in slightly different forms: "such enterprises had no need for the detailed organisation charts and manuals that had come into common use in large American and German firms before 1914;" (25) in a well-established company in which the founding families retained control, all members of the management and of the workforce knew exactly what their relationship to other parts of the company were without having consciously to articulate it. Based on the available sources, figure II attempts to reconstruct the main lines of management communication.

It aims to make explicit a number of the issues that have been raised with regard to the nature of the

**Figure II - Main channels of management communication**



the management hierarchy at Trumans. It shows a three tier level of management, with the Board of Directors at the top. They are clearly not involved merely in the making of strategic decisions. Not only did they not leave the daily running of the brewery to their senior management (the General Manager and the Works Manager), but they did not leave the running of the individual departments to the Heads of Departments under the direction of the Works Manager. This structure was one that had not changed dramatically since the nineteenth century, for although the brewery had experienced changes in production, all of these had occurred in such a way that the existing structure could accommodate them. In key respects this hierarchy conforms to Chandler's first category of organisation. Namely, management was conducted without the benefit of an extensive managerial hierarchy. This is not especially

surprising, for the companies that Chandler classifies in this particular way share a number of common characteristics with Trumans. The majority of packaged, branded goods fall into this category, many of which share the Quaker/evangelical background of Trumans, but additionally, most breweries examined by Chandler also exhibit this type of hierarchy. It therefore seems logical to conclude that the key variable in determining the managerial style of Trumans was the actual product, with its capital intensive nature. Religion must have been less significant, for the majority of brewers were not rooted in that tradition. However, the writings of individual members of the families make it clear that many of them perceived their actions as being governed by that religious/philanthropic dimension.



#### FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V

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8. Letter from T.F. Reeve to G. Buxton, 15th April, 1926, loc. cit.
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11. Directors Minute Books, 14th December, 1911
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14. Smith's Directors' Order Book, 21st March, 1939,
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17. R. Fitzgerald, British Labour Management and Industrial Welfare 1846 - 1939, London, 1988, p.143
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## **CHAPTER VI - THE WORK OF THE BREWERY**

### **I - Introduction**

The purpose of the next three chapters is to outline the main stages in the production, packaging and distribution of beer by Truman, Hanbury and Buxton in the inter-war period, indicating the work that was done at various stages by different groups of workers. Within this structure, some indications will be given of the internal hierarchies which existed and the ways in which movement within these was available to individual members of the workforce. In attempting to reconstruct such patterns, considerable use was made of the variety of statistical materials deposited at the GLC Record Office. In view of the plethora of material available, it was decided at a very early stage in this enquiry to focus on three specific years, rather than to try to look at all the inter-war material. This choice was to some extent governed by the materials, with some years having fewer resources than others. The three years finally selected were 1914, 1920 and 1936. Within the constraints of availability, the reasons for these choices were as follows. Firstly, 1914 was selected in order to give a pre-war perspective so that it would be possible to identify any significant changes that occurred in either the brewing industry or the company during the war. Secondly, 1920 was selected to give the post-war situation once the demobilised soldiers had, for the most part, returned to their

peace-time occupations. Thirdly, 1936 was selected as representing a period when the worst effects of the depression had receded. The concentration on these three years does not mean that there are no references to other years in these chapters, but that these three years will figure more prominently than any others.

Despite the variety of occupations that will be examined in these chapters, two prevailing and significantly different patterns of employment will be identified as occurring within the company. One is associated with those workers whose only skill was their physical strength and the other is associated with those who possessed a developed craft skill. Despite this skill, and hence wage differential, it will further be shown that in at least two key areas of the working of the company, there were not profound differences between the different types of occupational category. The first of these was the degree of worker loyalty, by whatever means it was engendered. The second was the existence of a clear pattern of career progression through the company, which can be discerned from a study of the career histories of large numbers of the workforce based on a range of wage records. The existence of this pattern was not explicitly identified by the management in their records. This may simply be because that, like the functioning of the management hierarchy, the system was understood by all who were involved, without the need for explicit articulation.

Nonetheless, the system clearly operated as an internal job ladder and could therefore potentially be regarded as a functional instrument of labour control, even if this were not the actual intention of the management.

## II - Beer production

The main Trumans maltings were located at Long Melford in Suffolk, although there were others at Sudbury and Lavenham. Barley would have been selected from local merchants, usually by the London Head Brewer, who would often have been accompanied by the Brewing Director. The process of converting barley into malt is a fairly lengthy and complex procedure. The way in which the process proceeded was that the barley was dried and screened to remove foreign corns, small grains and dust. It would then be stored for a period of at least five to six weeks before being tipped into steepers, which were large tanks filled with water. It would be left in these for a period of forty-eight to sixty hours while it germinated. At the end of that process, it would be tipped and spread onto one of the three floors at the malt house, to a depth determined by a Foreman Maltster which would be conditional on the state of the weather (the colder it was, the deeper the barley had to lie). After a further twenty-four hours, the malt would be thinned out using wooden shovels, which helped to encourage root growth to begin within the next twenty-four hours. Over the ensuing four to five days, it would be turned regularly to reduce heat build-up and to increase air circulation, thereby removing carbon dioxide. The green malt would then be shovelled into a kiln. The heat in the kiln would be gradually raised in order to complete the process and

reduce the moisture, which contributed to the arrest of the growth of the shoots and the withering of the roots. Malt that was intended for use in stouts and milds would be given a longer roasting than that which was used in pale ales, for it was malt that gave the dark beers their distinctive flavour. From the kiln, the malt was taken to a hopper for one final screening to remove the withered roots and dust before being stored in large bins for five to six weeks. The men involved in this work do not show up in the Trumans wages books because they were employed locally and on a seasonal basis. Nonetheless, the work that they performed was central to the operation of the brewery and represented its most costly element in terms of raw materials.

When it was finally ready, the malt would be transported to the brewery, where it would be stored in bins in the Malt Loft, according to place of origin, until it was required. Those employed in the Malt Loft were always small in number, rising to a maximum of seven in 1936, their growth in numbers coinciding with a general growth in the numbers employed in the Brewers' Department in order to meet the expanding demands of the Bottling Department. The day before a new brew was made, the operative brewer in charge of it would come to the Malt Loft to select the appropriate malt. The work of those employed in this area was to take the malt from the bins, either by suction plant or

by archimedean screw and to screen, weigh and finally grind it in the Mill Room. By the end of this process, grist would have been produced and would be stored in grist cases, ready for use. The men who worked in the Malt Loft came under the aegis of the Brewers' Department. For the ordinary labourers, their wages were comparable to those being earned by other general labourers in the Brewers' Department. There were, however, two important differences between Malt Loft labourers and general Brewers' labourers.

Firstly, those who were taken on to work in the Malt Loft in times of good trade, were more likely to remain as 'odd' men than those taken on in the Ale and Porter Tun Rooms; that is, they were more likely to remain on the books as temporary labourers, rather than to be made up to permanent members of the workforce. This meant that when trade was bad, little attempt would be made to protect their jobs. This situation was the result of a conscious strategy by the Board of Directors. In hard times, their aim was to keep on all members of their permanent workforce. By creating an area where those employed were all temporary, this group of workers could be laid off and members of the permanent workforce deployed there. (1) Such a strategy was widespread; Littler identifies it as part of a minimum interaction strategy, which was generally associated with firms which used close supervision, simple wage systems and rudimentary benefit packages.



(2) Secondly, in addition to the basic wage, there was an element of piece-work bonus paid for the work that was done grinding, weighing and working on the vacuum plant: in 1926, for example, the additional payments to two of the men working there amounted to four shillings and five shillings respectively. Such additional payments might be made to some general Brewers' labourers who took on special responsibilities, but they were less general among the general labourers than they were among the Malt Loft labourers. It seems possible that these two differences were connected; that in order to compensate the labourers for the vulnerability of their position, a mechanism was in place to enable them to achieve slightly higher wages on those occasions when they were employed.

The direct supervision of the work was carried out by an individual who at various times was referred to either as 'Foreman' or 'leading man' or 'in charge of gang'. It is hardly surprising that there should be some linguistic ambiguity about the status of the man in charge of this department. It was after all, small and generally comprised of temporary labourers. Promotion to the post was relatively easy, both in view of the size of the department and the nature of the conditions under which the labourers were employed. Thus, any worker who was transferred from the temporary labour force of the department onto the permanent books was likely to be able to achieve promotion, even if

this took a number of years. This can be illustrated by looking at the careers of two members of the department.

#### Case Study I - Malt Loft

Year	Position	weekly wage
1901	Started work in the Malt Loft as an 'odd' man, aged twenty-four	£1-04-0
1921	Deputy Malt Loft	£3-16-0
1923	Leading man on Malt Loft	£3-13-0
1930	No longer acting Foreman	£4-00-0
1936	Still employed in Malt Loft	£4-00-0

#### Case Study II - Malt Loft

1919	Started work in the Malt Loft as an 'odd' man, aged seventeen	£2-00-0
1938	Leading hand	£4-03-0

(3)

Case study I gives a further clue to the nature of the work that was carried out in this department. In exactly the same way as his predecessor, this Foreman was made down from the position a number of years before he left the employ of the company. This seems to be the only department in the brewery where this phenomenon occurred. It seems likely that this was the consequence of the inability of a man in late middle age simultaneously to undertake supervisory duties accompanied by heavy manual labour, a situation that was the norm in this department because of the small number of workers employed. Hannah has pointed out that this type of downward movement was no rare thing: "In

many manual occupations, earnings peaked at age forty-five and after that it was increasingly difficult to find new employment; from age fifty-five men frequently had to drop skilled occupations entirely," (4) which in those companies Hannah examined was generally accompanied by a cut in wages. Trumans was an exception to this pattern. Although in both of these cases, the individuals no longer carried out the 'skilled' work of supervision that had led to an additional payment, they did not lose that payment once they dropped the occupation. This reinforces earlier remarks about the strategies employed by the management to create a sense of worker loyalty. Such a tangible sign of concern was likely to contribute to the longer term commitment of the Foreman, secure in the knowledge of his own likely future treatment. It would also, in a more indirect way, serve to motivate others employed elsewhere in the brewery by demonstrating employer loyalty on the part of the management. In this way, a functional element of control was being exercised at a cost of less than forty pounds per annum (the approximate difference between what a Foreman and a hand would have been paid). The management itself, however, would probably have seen its actions in terms of its concern for the human element in business that derived from its traditional approach.

The next stage of the brewing process was one that required very little judgement. When the stokers

arrived to begin their shift at 5.45am, they would heat the liquor (water) which had been pumped up from a bore hole drilled eight hundred and forty-five feet deep into London's artesian basin in 1910. The water from here had a high carbonate level, making it eminently suitable for the production of brown ale, porter and stout. It could not be used to make pale ale of the Burton type until after 1927, when Charrington's found that by the addition of magnesium sulphate, gypsum and lime, the water could be hardened. The grist was fed into the top of a Steel's mashing machine into which hot liquor would be injected. The grist and liquor would be agitated together within the machine and the resultant mash would run into mash tuns, with the stoker ensuring that the correct temperature was maintained at all times. The remaining workers within this department would begin their shift at 6.30am, by which time, the mashing would be close to completion. The mash would be left in the mash tuns for between one and a half and two hours in order to convert the starch that was contained in the malt into sugar, which would be used at a subsequent stage of the brewing process. At this point, the malt extract, which was called the wort, was drawn off through the bottom of the tuns at the rate of one hundred and twenty barrels per hour and pumped into the coppers. The mash was sparged (sprayed with hot liquor) to flush out all the wort, whilst the residual spent grains from the mash tuns would be sold

on, eventually to be used as cattle feed.

The coppers were located in different areas depending on what type of beer would ultimately be produced in them; some in the Ale Tun Room and some in the porter Tun Room. The men who were employed in this process of moving the beer to the appropriate place were known as stage workers. Like all the utensils that were used in the brewing process, the coppers had to be kept meticulously clean in order to enable the correct chemical reaction to take place. In 1913, there was one labourer whose job was classified as 'copper scourer'. He earned a basic weekly wage of £1-9-0, together with an additional bonus of two shillings when there was no work as a copper scourer available, when he would be put to racking. This combined wage was the same as that received by other general labourers within the Tun Rooms, and as this specific job description did not appear again, it can only be assumed that this work was subsumed within the normal duties of the workforce. Not all cleaning work was subsumed in this way. In 1927, for example, one of the general labourers was awarded a weekly bonus of three shillings because he had been put in charge of mains cleaning, a bonus that had risen to twelve shillings by 1937, a clear indication of the degree of importance that the management attached to this activity.

At this point the operative brewer would play a central role in the production process through his

decision regarding exactly how much sugar and hops to add to the brew. Such operative brewers were "managerial" as opposed to "manual", but in view of their direct involvement in the brewing process, it was felt that this was a more appropriate place to examine their role. The operative brewer would have received a formal education, which might have included a university training, but which at the very least would have involved attendance at some form of technical training. In London, the Sir John Cass Technical Institute, at which some of the Trumans' operative brewers gave occasional lectures, provided such technical training. In addition to James Stenhouse, the Head Brewer and W.T. Smith, the Second Brewer, there were six operative brewers. It is clear that such men regarded themselves as professionals: "his training had to be as comprehensive and thorough as that of any of the recognised professions," but there was a general feeling that they were not accorded that position: "yet he was generally not regarded as belonging to that status." (5)

It was the opinion of this group that their lack of status was reflected in the level of their remuneration: "after the 1914 - 18 War, there were indications that while the salaries of other brewery employees had been substantially increased, the claims of the operative brewers had in many cases been overlooked." (6) In order to assess the validity of

this assertion as far as Trumans is concerned, a comparison will be made of three categories of workers - operative brewers, brewers and clerks - by looking at the increase in earnings of two workers within each category. This is clearly an imperfect measure for a number of reasons. Firstly, although in the choice of worker category, an attempt was made to select both a high-earning member and a typical member of the department, such a choice is clearly arbitrary, and the use of an atypical employee may therefore affect the findings. Secondly, the wages provided follow the position rather than an individual, so no account can be taken of any incremental increases. In spite of these problems, it should be possible to draw some general, as opposed to specific, conclusions about any changes that took place in the relative position of operative brewers between 1913 and 1920.

**Table III - Wage increases 1913 - 20**

	Percentage increase
<b>OPERATIVE BREWERS</b>	
Head Brewer	57
Fourth Brewer	85.7
<b>BREWERS</b>	
Foreman (Best paid)	153
Labourer (average wage)	154
<b>CLERKS</b>	
Wharf cooperage clerk	357
Surveyor	150

It would appear on the basis of this table that the complaints being made by operative brewers in general were well founded in reality as far as Trumans were concerned. Compared to both the salaried element of which they were part and the waged element with which they came into daily contact, their differential position was being squeezed. The reason for the rise among the former group is relatively straightforward. The combination of the development of collective bargaining and the impact of the Central Control Board were both likely to have played a role in the increase, although it is not possible to assess exactly what the relative importance of each was. The reason for the remarkable increase for the wharf cooperage clerk is not clear, but it is interesting to note that the percentage increase experienced by the surveyor closely tracked those of the brewers, which may well be more than mere coincidence.

Two factors must however be borne in mind. Firstly, there is no evidence that Trumans' operative brewers were amongst those who were complaining about their position. Secondly, even if on the basis of this evidence, it is felt likely that they were unhappy about their position, too simplistic a picture should not be drawn. A comparison of the actual annual earnings of each group in 1913 shows a very different picture: the Head Brewer was earning £2,000, the best paid Foreman was earning £130 and the wharf cooperage



clerk was earning £70. Nor should it be forgotten that operative brewers received benefits other than cash wages as part of their remuneration. Company houses would be provided for all of them close by. Amongst the benefits were subsidised rents and coal. Unmarried men lived in a company provided hostel which laid on all food and domestic needs. In spite of these advantages, their skills were not transferrable and it is clear that dissatisfaction was pervasive throughout the industry as far as this group was concerned. It seems probable that had such dissatisfaction translated itself into conflict between this group and the management of the brewery, there would have been some reference made to it in the Directors' Minutes. In view of this lack of reference, it would appear that a general sense of dissatisfaction did not lead to conflict.

Sugar was added to supplement the natural sugars extracted from the malt in order to modify the flavour of the resultant beer. In 1923, one of the brewery labourers received an additional £1 in his Christmas present for the work he had done with the sacchrometer, so although the amount of sugar added was determined by an operative brewer, it appears that it was possible for an unskilled worker to monitor the progress of the process. The sugar that was added was produced in Trumans' own sugar refinery from cane sugar for which they paid £38,000 in the year to Rest 1931. This was an

unusual practice in a period when most brewers bought their requirements direct from the sugar refiners, but there is no indication provided in the materials as to why Trumans pursued this policy. The work involved did not engage a worker full time, so some of the stage workers received additional weekly payments when they were employed working on the sugar floor (one shilling over and above normal rates in 1929).

The other raw material added at this stage was hops. The purpose of these were to act both as a preservative and to give the beer its distinctive flavour and aroma. In order to achieve this second aim, about one pound of hops would be added for the light beers which were produced in the Ale Tun Room and about three to four pounds for the dark beers which were produced in the Porter Tun Room. Part of the supply came from the company's own hop farm near Paddock Wood in Kent, where the workforce was employed locally and seasonally as the need dictated. Generally, further stocks had to be bought in; in the year to Rest 1931, this amounted to over £27,000. It seems likely that the purchase of a considerable amount of these stocks which were bought in was arranged through the firm of Pelly. A hop review meeting was mentioned as taking place between three of the Directors and Mr. Pelly, a hop merchant, in order to look at the state of the market and make the decision as to when to buy. (8) In view of the fact that one of E.N. Buxton's daughters had the

married name of Pelly and that John Pelly, hop merchant, witnessed a codicil to E.N. Buxton's will, it seems likely that the Pellys would carry out a great deal of the work associated with the purchase of hops, being connected by marriage with the most influential of the three families who comprised the company. The decisions about when to buy became more straightforward after 1931, for the Agricultural Marketing Act of that year established quotas on the growing of hops which led to a price stabilisation.

The wort, hops and sugar were boiled together in the copper over a furnace of anthracite coal. In 1913 and 1920, there were workers whose specific designation was 'stoker' and who were responsible for this aspect of the work, but in 1921, their occupational classification within the brewery became 'stagemen', a term which had formerly referred to that group of workers who were associated with moving the wort around and carrying out the processes of the early stages of production, the name being derived from the gantry or stage around the mash tun. After 1921, this group known as 'stage men' subsumed the work previously done by both stokers and stage men. This appears to have given the management more flexibility in the way in which these workers could be moved around to work in different areas, although it is possible that it merely marked a change of job title rather than a profound change in the structure of the work.

After the mixture had boiled in the copper for about two hours it would be run by gravity into tanks called hopbacks which only let through the liquid hopped wort, holding back the spent hops, which would be sold for horticultural purposes. The hopped wort would then be pumped into the Ale or Porter Tun Rooms. It was this aspect of the production process that saw one of the principal technical changes of the period, although it is not clear precisely when it came into operation at Trumans. The cooling process "used to take place in flat, open tanks, a slow process and one involving the risk of airborne infection, but it is now generally carried out by running the wort over brine pipes in specially constructed chambers filled with pure air." (9) This particular improvement made it less likely for a brew to be spoiled and meant a reduction of about eight hours in the length of time the process took. In practice though, it made very little difference to the nature of the work being carried out by the labour force.

That the company would make use of any improvement that was likely to maximise its efficiency was a feature of its management commented upon by any number of apparently impartial observers, Rose being just one example among many: "This great business has grown in a haphazard fashion, highly typical of London, the most modern machinery being set behind walls of the early nineteenth century." (10) In spite of such

praise, the overwhelming impression that is conveyed by the various sources is that any decision to make such changes to the brewing processes or indeed to other aspects of the running of the brewery was a long-term process. Trumans was not conservative - the Board was clearly prepared to make changes and to innovate, but they were not ahead of the field; they would wait and see whether such changes worked effectively before committing themselves.

The liquid would leave the coolers at 60 degrees Fahrenheit and be pumped to the fermenting squares of the fermentation rooms. At this point the final reaction would be induced by the introduction of yeast at the rate of one and a quarter pounds per barrel of wort. Samples would be taken from the fermenting squares every six hours under the supervision of a Foreman in order to measure the gravity of the beer. Generally, as the temperature of fermentation rose, the gravity would drop. This reaction, and hence the final strength of the beer could be modified using an attenuator which enabled "the brewer to check or accelerate the rate of fermentation by passing iced liquor at the desired speed through them." (11) During the normal day shift this work would be carried out by labourers who were classified either as Ale Tun Room workers or Porter Tun Room workers. They would receive an additional payment to their basic wage for this work, which in both 1913 and 1920 amounted to two shillings

weekly. The knowledge to carry out this work was acquired in on-the-job training. Experienced men would show an inexperienced man who had been identified as being responsible how to monitor the reactions. In this way, those with no skill would develop what was regarded as a semi-skilled status within the hierarchy of the workplace. It is clear that this 'skill' was industry-specific and could not be transferred to another industry. In this way the management was further imposing a functional control on the labour force, although there is no suggestion that this was an overt strategy of labour control.

It is clear that the brew would have to be monitored at all times in order to prevent undesired reactions taking place in it, but the wage records suggest that only a skeleton gang would be employed on the night shift. In 1914, all the stokers would have to expect to be a part of this gang at some time, and this was reflected in a basic wage that was one shilling higher than that of other labourers in this department. Where ordinary labourers were called in to work the night shift, their basic rate would be supplemented and if they were called upon to work a Sunday, they would earn an additional fifteen shillings. This may mean that the practice identified by Booth as taking place in the London breweries in the earlier part of the century still persisted: "A gang can be summoned in at night to clean fermenting vessels if fermentation takes

**Table IV - Main shifts in the Brewers Department**

Day shift (all workers except the stokers who were to begin 45 minutes earlier and to finish at 3pm Monday to Friday, noon on Saturday, but were only ever to have a 45 minute break in their day.)

Monday - Thursday	6.30am - 5pm	1.75 hours
Friday	6.30am - 4.30pm	1.75 hours
Saturday	6.30am - 12 noon	.75 hours

**Night shift**

**Ale and porter refrigeration**

Monday to Thursday	2.15pm - 11.45pm	1 hour
Friday	1.45pm - 11.45pm	1 hour
Alternate Saturdays	6am - 6pm	2 hours

**Stokers**

Monday to Friday	2.30pm - 11.45pm	1.5 hours
Sunday	1am - 6am	.5 hours

**Fermentation men**

Monday to Thursday	7.30pm - 6.30am	1.5 hours
Friday	7pm - 6.30am	1.5 hours
Saturday	6pm - 6.30am	2 hours

place at a different rate to that expected." (13) The main part of the brewery's work was thus done as far as possible in daytime working hours, but the nature of the end product meant that there had to be some supervision of the processes at all times. However, this was kept to the minimum possible level consistent with maintaining the quality of the brew for at least

two reasons. Firstly, the working of unsocial hours did attract higher wages. To remain cost effective, the management would wish to restrict these to the bare minimum. Secondly, this was reinforced by the moral ethos of the company's nineteenth century traditions which had encouraged limitations on working hours. T.F. Buxton, at the start of the nineteenth century had enforced a strict Sunday observance, whilst in the 1880s, the partners had been at the forefront of a campaign to obtain half-day Saturday working. Thus, for both practical and familial reasons, there was a commitment to keep unsocial working hours to a minimum.

Fermentation took about one week in all. Approximately twenty-four hours after it had started, a light frothy head would appear. This would be allowed to fall over the top of the fermentation squares where it was collected and could subsequently be re-used. A more vigorous fermentation then ensued, this time being skimmed off by boards run across the tops of the squares. The brew would then be dropped into a cleansing tank where fermentation continued until a stable end-product had been effected. In the course of this process, carbon dioxide gas would be given off, and this would be collected under copper domes hung over the fermentation squares. This gas would be sucked into containers and pumped to the Bottling Stores where it would be used in the carbonation process. At this



point the beer itself had been produced and was now ready for the next stage in its progress - its packaging, either as keg beer or as bottled beer.

It seems probable that Trumans followed the practice of other London breweries, identified by Hugh-Jones in the New Survey of London Life and Labour of dividing its operative brewers into three shifts, each shift consisting of two men. (14) This did not necessarily mean that there would be an operative brewer on the site; it was quite possible that they were simply on emergency call, to be called in in the event of a problem. It was part of their conditions of service that they lived adjacent to the brewery, in company-provided accomodation, should they wish it. It was the Foreman who generally supervised the actual process of brewing, calling upon the operative brewer if faced with problems that were beyond their competence. They would have gained their knowledge and experience in on-the-job training, and their promotion would have been a reward for hard work, ability and reliability. A typical career pattern would have been one such as that experienced by this employee:

Year	Position	Weekly wage
1872	Began in Ale Tun Room as 'odd man' aged twenty-one	£1-01-0
1898	Assistant Foreman	£1-12-0
1901	Second Foreman	£1-15-0
1920	Foreman	£5-09-0

(15)

This man was pensioned off in the same year that he was made up to Foreman. By that time, he had savings of £94 in the Savings Bank, he owned £200 worth of War Bonds and his own house. This then was the path of a successful member of the workforce, but it was not an avenue open to all. The number of men who worked in the brewery made this a progression that was only available to a small percentage of the labour force.

To summarise then, the majority of work that was carried out by the brewers was unskilled, heavy labour: "Physical strength rather than skill is required of brewers' men." (16) The sort of work that they were engaged upon included the cleaning of tuns and vats, moving beer from one area of operations to another, adding ingredients to the brew under supervision and, on occasions, moving into the next phase of the process and helping in the cellars. As has already been indicated, individual labourers who took on what were considered to be 'responsible' duties were likely to be paid a supplement to the basic rate that all labourers earned. Once a worker had been allocated an area of responsibility, the pattern seems to have been for him to continue to fulfill that task for the duration of his employment with the company. Thus, where the workers had a perception of themselves as being semi-skilled, it was derived from constant repetition rather than through the acquisition of a skill or through specialist training. This pattern was one that

dated back into the nineteenth century, for as Barnard had noted when he visited Trumans: "two or three of the mash men to whom we were speaking stated that they had been in the same occupation for the firm over forty years and they were by no means either the eldest or the longest in service." (17) That this pattern persisted into the twentieth century is clear from a perusal of the wage books. Over long periods of time the same individual would receive additional payments for their responsibility in carrying out the same task. Thus, an internal job ladder existed that because of its industry-specific nature acted as a mechanism for retaining those labourers who had been identified as able and reliable.

Most of the labourers in this and other departments began as 'odd' men, that is as temporary labour. Although the demand for labour within a brewery was likely to remain fairly constant, it could be affected either by the changing state of the trade or by seasonal changes in demand. By retaining part of the workforce on a temporary basis, these would be among the first to be laid off should the need arise. In 1920, when the wage records showed whether members of the department were permanent or temporary, 42 per cent (thirty-one out of a total workforce of seventy-three) were recorded as 'odd' men, although of these, twenty-three had been continuously employed by the company for more than a year and the remainder had come

into the company's employ when it took over the Kilburn Brewery. It is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about this situation or to draw any comparisons with other years as this was the only occasion when the classifications were made explicit. It does, however, show that temporary did not necessarily mean short-term, and suggests that this group were always likely to be a significant element in this department, with its emphasis on physical rather than skilled work and its immediate sensitivity to any changes in demand. In terms of remuneration, these 'odd' men would receive the same basic wages as the permanent men, the same additional payments for extra work and would be entitled to a range of the welfare benefits that were on offer. If they remained long enough in the company's employ, they tended to be automatically made up to permanent workers, although the time scale on this depended on the state of trade and the rate of labour turn-over.

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

1. Directors' Minute Books, 4th January, 1912
2. C.R. Littler, The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Society, London, 1982, p.15
3. Information derived from various materials held at the GLC
4. L. Hannah, Inventing Retirement, Cambridge, 1986, p.7
5. The Operative Brewers Directory 1927 - 28, 24
6. W.H. Bird, A History of the Institute of Brewing, London, 1955, p.24
7. Information derived from various wage materials stored at the GLC
8. Monthly Reports 1908 - 38, 23rd September, 1909
9. New Survey of London Life and Labour, volume V, London, 1933, p.83
10. M. Rose, The East End of London, London, 1951, p.47
11. Black Eagle, July 1932, 4 - 5
12. Smith's Directors' Order Book, 26th May, 1920 and 11th June, 1920
13. Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People of London, Series 2, volume 3, London, 1903, p.121
14. New Survey of London Life and Labour, p.85
15. Information derived from Brewers' Men Wage materials, GLC
16. Charles Booth, op. cit., p.123
17. A. Barnard, Noted Breweries of Great Britain and Ireland, London, 1888, p.191

## CHAPTER VII - PACKAGING THE PRODUCT

The fairly bright product that had now been stored in the cleansing tanks would move forward in one of two ways. It would either be put into a barrel or it would be bottled. This chapter will be concerned with an examination of those who were involved in both of these processes.

If the beer were to be delivered to a customer in a barrel, it would be pumped into a racking square after a further three to four days in the cleansing tank, where any excess sediment would be removed. Generally, this work would be carried out by labourers from the Brewers' department, but it was regarded as so responsible that in 1927 it attracted an additional ten shillings per week payment for those who were employed in doing it. In the cellars, the beer would be racked into casks and then stored until its sale. Until the 1920s, ale would be racked in Number 10 cellar and porter in Number 18 cellar. In this decade, a rebuilding programme resulted in the integration of all racking into one set of cellars. Until 1909, the racking process was time-consuming and labour intensive: the finings were added by a hand pump which required four men to operate it. A hose then had to be attached and operated by hand in order to rack the beer from one cask to another. From 1909, these processes were semi-mechanised, enabling one man to fill up to nine barrels simultaneously. This change appeared to be

viewed positively by the workforce. When L. Cooper, a cellarman at Whitbreads, was put to work on the machine at that brewery after the Great War, he perceived it as a promotion from his previous work as a stower (the man in charge of marshalling the casks at the appropriate delivery point in the cellar), which in turn had been a promotion from his first job of simply moving the casks around. (1)

As far as Trumans is concerned, the wage books give a very detailed breakdown of the various activities that were carried out by individual members of the Cellars department during 1936. Eighteen of the twenty-eight members of the department had identifiable functions, a survey of which will give some impression of the diversity of work which was carried out here. The Foreman earned £6 per week, a figure that was very nearly equal to that earned by the senior foreman in the Brewers department, although the latter post involved responsibility for considerably more men and for more complicated processes. The likely explanation for this is the fact that the opportunities for theft in the Cellars were greater than in the Brewers. In order to minimise this risk, those who were employed here were rewarded with slightly higher wages than were the norm. There was one worker in charge of returned beer earning 76 shillings per week. He was responsible for adding back to existing brews any beer that had been returned by customers because it was inadequately

racked. The aim was obviously that this should not happen too frequently, so a sample room checker on a wage of 69 shillings per week was employed to take samples from various casks and check them for temperature, quality and clarity. There were workers in charge of running the beers into the cellars (74 shillings per week), cleaning the cellars (65 shillings per week), and even of cutting bung rags, which would be used to stopper the bung holes in the casks (68 shillings per week). There were also, of course, those who ran the racking machines. If one examines the wage levels of the department, it appears that their work seems to have experienced a downgrading in the hierarchy of the department in the period following the introduction of semi-mechanisation. By 1936, workers engaged in this function were earning between 65 and 66 shillings per week, whereas some general labourers were earning up to 68 shillings per week, although the range began at 58 shillings. General labourers would be involved in a variety of tasks, many of which involved hard physical labour. They would move the casks from one part of the operation to another and participate in the constant process of washing and steam cleaning.

There was a great deal of overlap between work done in this department and that done in the Brewers department. The records show that individual workers were likely to move between the two areas in the course of their working life. Thus, for example, the workman



who acted as Foreman of Number 18 cellar from 1907 to 1921 was moved to the post of junior Foreman in the Brewers in 1921, becoming senior Foreman in 1924. It was just as likely that a worker would be moved from the Brewers to the Cellars. Indeed, where this did happen, it seems probable that some form of hidden selection procedure was at work, in view of the necessity for absolute certainty about the honesty of those employed there. Such a move would offer the individual a proportionately greater opportunity for advancement because of the smaller numbers employed there. Therefore in this department too, the prospect of promotion via an internal job ladder was available to members of the labour force and would act functionally as a means for enhancing worker loyalty.

The barrels that were used in the cellars were all supplied by the company's own cooperage. The men who worked in this department were divided into a clear hierarchy of skill. At the base of that hierarchy were the labourers. As in other departments, they shared a basic work specification together with a basic wage, but additional duties would attract additional payments to their remuneration. In spite of their status, they provided through their labours " a very large part of the cooperage operations," (2) namely the receiving and the washing of casks that were being returned by the trade. When the casks arrived back at the brewery they would be subjected to a rigorous sterilising procedure.

Firstly, they would be filled with boiling water and left to stand for as long as possible to soften any deposits on them and make the subsequent washing easier. Shives and corks would then be removed and washing would then take place. This was done semi-automatically until 1922, with the labourer in charge of the machines earning an extra two shillings per week for the responsibility. In 1922, the process was fully mechanised when the 'Goliath' was introduced, enabling more efficient and sterile cleaning of the kegs. The labourer in charge of this not only earned an additional five shillings per week for the responsibility, but was also given an assistant on an extra shilling per week. This indicates that in this particular instance, mechanisation did not appear to lead to any form of deskilling, but instead created additional status for the labourer given this position. It is difficult to assess whether mechanisation had a profound effect on the number of jobs available in the cooperage. In 1920, there were thirty-four unskilled workers employed there. By 1936, there were thirty-one of whom 58.7 per cent had been employed for more than sixteen years. (3) It is true that the total number of workers employed in the brewery expanded rapidly in this period, but the majority of the increase was concerned with bottling and with services to the brewery and the tied trade, so there may be little significance in the fact that the numbers employed

remained static.

As a barrel progressed through the Goliath, a series of nozzles would emit either boiling hot water or steam or cold water into the interior of the cask via the bung hole. The machine could deal with something in the region of one hundred and seventy barrels per hour. At the end of the run, a general labourer would be waiting whose task it was to scrub off any earlier brew or destination marks. The casks would then be placed on drying and cooling nozzles through which pure filtered air would be driven under pressure. Once each barrel had been sterilised in this way, it would be passed onto a labourer known as a 'smeller' who would put his nose to the bung hole in order to smell the interior. If he detected any unusual smell, he would resubmit the barrel for a further washing. Once the smeller had passed the barrel it would once more be filled with hot water and allowed to stand before being passed on to the 'pricker'. He would put a rod through the tap hole, moving it around within the cask to determine whether all the debris had been removed. Like the smeller, if he were not satisfied with what he found, he would resubmit the barrel for further washing and sterilisation. All these labourers, together with others who were employed in the cooperage to move barrels around both within the cooperage and back to the cellars, were unskilled. Like the men who worked elsewhere in the brewery, they were initially

taken on as 'odd' men and later made permanent. They might pick up the knack of doing certain tasks quickly and easily and they might find themselves additionally recompensed for this, but they could not be regarded as having acquired a skill in a traditional sense. Further, apart from the additional payments that were made for the specific tasks identified above, there was no real opportunity for promotion of the type afforded in other departments of the brewery. Yet in spite of this, the length of service of those employed in this department was high, as table V illustrates, with 74 per cent of the unskilled labourers in the department having served at least ten years.

**Table V - Length of service by labourers in the Cooperage, 1936**

1 - 2 years	1	
3 - 5 years	2	
6 - 10 years	7	
11 - 15 years	4	
16 - 20 years	6	
21 - 25 years	4	
26 - 30 years	2	
31 - 35 years	2	
36 - 40 years	2	
41 - 45 years	1	(4)

It is clear that this degree of loyalty was not achieved through internal job ladders as they were non-existent in this department. The only apparant

variable between the Cooperage and the Brewers departments was a three shilling per week (68 to 65 shillings) differential in terms of basic wages in favour of those employed in the cooperage. This raises interesting questions. Whilst it may be the factor that ensured loyalty among the cooperage labourers, it might have been expected to cause conflict amongst those labourers for whom it was not available and who were not experiencing success on the internal job ladders. This apparent lack of conflict may therefore possibly be regarded as the consequence of the welfare practices successfully engendering the loyalty of the majority of the labour force and minimising the need for conflict.

When the cask had been satisfactorily sterilised it would be examined by a trimming cooper to see if it required any repairs. Should any be needed, he would obtain the necessary materials and carry out that repair. None of the available sources identify the training that these men had in order to carry out the work, but as every one of them was in their mid-twenties or older when employed by the company, one can only assume that they had received some sort of craft or apprentice training elsewhere. They received a flat wage rate, which unsurprisingly was considerably in excess of that of the general labourer; in 1936, for example, the trimming coopers were earning more than £4 per week, whilst most of the labourers in the cooperage were earning a basic rate of 68 shillings.

One step above the trimming coopers in the hierarchy were the slightly more numerous shop coopers. These had certainly received a full seven year apprenticeship, as several of them had received their training in the Trumans cooperage. Others had worked their way through the ranks of the trimming coopers at the company to be finally made up to shop coopers, whilst a third group were directly employed from elsewhere, presumably when the first two groups provided insufficient numbers. In contrast to the trimming coopers, the shop coopers were members of a craft society. The work of this group was to make new barrels. Unusually for the brewery trade, they were supplied by a sawyer who was actually employed at the site, providing a fourth level within the hierarchy, somewhere between the general labourers and the trimming coopers. The shop coopers were paid on a piece rate basis that was linked to the prevailing craft rate. The wage books do not give the piece rate, but summarise the average weekly earnings of each cooper, which for most was significantly higher than the trimming coopers. In 1936, all earned more than the trimming coopers, with only one earning less than £5 per week and the maximum being £6. It was from amongst the ranks of the coopers, whether they be trimming or shop coopers that the Foremen for this department came. There was a senior Foreman who took overall responsibility for the entire department, aided by an

under Foreman who was responsible specifically for the work of the labourers and a deputy Foreman whose remit was the work being undertaken by the skilled men. It was very unlikely that someone who had not held one of the two junior posts would be promoted to the senior post. In the inter-war period both of the men who successively held the post had been in the employment of the company for a considerable period of time; the first for seventeen years and the second for twenty-two years. There was thus a clear division in the department with the skilled men having access to a promotion ladder that was unavailable to the unskilled men.

Whilst primitive forms of bottling had gone on since 1889 at Coverley Fields, a five and a quarter acre site that was located some quarter of a mile from the Brick Lane brewery in Whitechapel, it was not until 1897 that chilled and filtered beer to be sold in a bottle was produced at the brewery. Yet within a very short space of time, the Bottling department was to grow to be one of the largest departments in terms of the number of people it employed and its output was to become a significant element in the trade of the company. It was suggested in 1933 that the bottled trade amounted to one-third of the brewing industry's trade in London. (5) It was also said to be significant in the sense that it brought about a fundamental change in the structure of the workforce by the introduction

of women onto the shop floor.

In the early years, the approach of the company to the production and marketing of this new product was tentative. Little investment was made, with the department comprising "more or less of Mr. Harry Buxton, Mr. Browne, a couple of girls, an old syphon filler and a gross or two of screw pints." (6) This reinforces the point made earlier about the role of management. A member of the Board was directly and explicitly associated with the department, implying that a considerable amount of time was spent there. The experience of the Bottling department also reinforces earlier remarks about the company's cautious approach to change. Bottling work was initially carried on at Brick Lane and Coverley Fields and comprised merely of the bottling process itself, with the beer being brewed at Burton. More than a decade after their entry into this market, production remained low. Changes that were initiated from 1908 were to provide the foundation for the expansion of the department. In August 1908, new bottling stores were opened at Tottenham and following this production levels did begin to rise: in December 1908, one hundred and twenty barrels in quarts had been produced for the tied trade; by March 1910 this figure stood at seven hundred. This growth led to the creation of a new clerical post with specific responsibility for bottled beers in the tied trade where previously such work had been carried out as an



adjunct by a clerk with more general duties. By the end of 1910, in addition to the three sites already mentioned, bottling in the London area was also going on at Brixton, Chiswick and Ilford, with provincial depots at Birkenhead, Newcastle and Swansea. Such decentralisation arose from managerial policy, for it reduced transport costs and would ultimately lead to greater economic efficiency. In the early years the department was running at a loss, for having decided to invest in a number of depots, capital and building costs had to be recouped. However, the losses of £5,500 in 1914 had turned to a profit of just over £2,500 by 1915, (7) and on every other occasion that the Bottling department is mentioned in the Directors' Minute Books, it is to record a substantial profit margin.

There do exist some records for those employed at depots other than Brick Lane, but they tend to be rather patchy. Furthermore, all other aspects of this study tend to have focused on Brick Lane. Therefore, most of the remarks that follow will continue this practice. There arose a considerable increase in the demand for bottled beers in the period following the end of the war which could not be met exclusively from the beer being produced at Burton. Some of the brewing was therefore taken over by Brick Lane. Such an increase in demand meant that there also had to be a simultaneous increase in brewing, bottling and

distribution capacity. At Brick Lane, this increase was to be achieved in two principal ways: through a building programme and through technical development.

Alteration and building work was a continuous feature of the period. It began in 1916, when women were first employed on the Brick Lane site, thus necessitating modifications to toilet and washing facilities. By 1932, Number 19 store had been converted to bottling and a new bottling stores factory had been opened. These physical changes meant that the various advances that were being made in the mechanisation of the production of bottled beer in response to the growing consumer demand for the product could be introduced into the brewery. When bottling had first begun at Brick Lane, the processes involved in the washing, filling and stoppering of the bottles had largely been carried out by hand. The treatment of the beer in the bottles had been determined by a Foreman who had been brought into the new department from the Brewers: "the amount of carbonation in each bottle was left to the discretion of the Foreman in charge and depended on such factors as the weather." (8) By 1929, however, it was possible for a visiting journalist to remark that "they have laid down a magnificent automatic bottling plant, equipped with the latest machinery." (9) The impact of mechanisation was dramatic; before it had taken place "it cost a brewery, on average, two and a half pence to bottle a dozen

bottles; after mechanisation the cost fell to a halfpenny." (10) It was possible to pass at least a part of this saving on to the consumer, and in the process to generate even more demand for the product.

**Table VI - Numbers employed in Bottling 1914 - 36**

	1914	1920	1936
Men	93	56	124(+93 delivery)
Women	51	42	119
Total	144	98	233

(11)

The increasing demand for bottled beer was clearly reflected by the growing numbers of people employed in the department. The rate of this growth was not matched by any other department (see Appendix I). It can also be seen from the figures that the picture was not one of uninterrupted growth. The explanation for this seem to lie in the general state of trade at that time. Faced with a slack period in 1920, the brewery responded by laying off workers. Bottling was particularly sensitive to such economic fluctuations according to one contemporary source because "as these workers are not skilled, there is no pressure on a firm to retain them during a slack time and changes in demand therefore have more effect on employment by bottlers than brewers." (12) It is difficult to assess how accurate this conclusion is. It is true that bottling did not require skill, but then neither did other tasks carried out by general labourers within the brewery. It has already been indicated that any "skill"

that was acquired was job and industry-specific. It has also been indicated that in certain departments, 'odd' men were specifically employed in order to have a buffer of labourers who would be the first to be laid off in a recession.

What was identifiably different about Bottling was the age structure of its male employees, although again 1920 does not conform to the general trend, presumably because of the impact of the war.

**Table VII - Age structure of men employed in Bottling  
by percentage**

	1914	1920	1936
Under 21	61.3	28.6	52.6
Under 25	63.4	51.8	67.3
Under 30	73	64.3	74.6

(13)

What the material implies is that the nature of the work that was carried out by the boys and men in this department required little of the "skill" in the sense that the word has been used with regard to brewing. Additionally, no boy was ever made permanent, but had to wait until the age of twenty-one. Therefore, those employed in this department would be vulnerable to shifts in the economy.

By 1936, the substantial number of men who were employed in bottling had been divided into two groups. There were those who were employed in the Factory and

those who were employed on deliveries that were specifically connected with the bottled trade. Both sections employed a large number of boys in unskilled work. At the age of twenty-one, a boy would be interviewed and a decision would be made as to whether to offer them a permanent job. For instance, had a boy been taken on in the delivery section as a vanboy, he might hope to be engaged as a junior carman at twenty-one, being advanced to carman at twenty-four. In the first instance, the boys would be interviewed by Jeacock in his capacity as Works Manager, but the final decision lay with the Board of Directors and would be closely linked to the state of trade at the time a boy reached his majority. In 1932, for instance, Jeacock referred back to the Board the cases of sixteen boys for whom no adult jobs were currently available and recommended that any decision should be deferred for a further six weeks. (14) It therefore appears that although workers in bottling were likely to be among the first to be laid off in trade recessions, the mere fact of transition from boy to adult did not automatically lead to a lay-off designed to save the cost of an adult wage.


The more precarious nature of the Bottling department is clearly indicated by a comparison of the length of service of its labour force with that of the Brewers department. (see graphs I, II and III) Although those who were employed in Bottling would receive the

Graph I - A comparison of length of service of men employed  
in Bottling and Brewing, 1914

KEY

Bottling men


Brewers' Men



Graph II - A comparison of length of service of men employed  
in Bottling and Brewing, 1920

KEY

Bottling men  
Brewers' Men




Graph III - A comparison of length of service of men employed  
in Bottling and Brewing 1936

KEY

Bottling men

Brewers' Men





same benefits as those employed elsewhere in the brewery, by themselves they were clearly insufficient compensation for the failure to provide other key variables that were generally available to men working in other parts of the brewery. These were a reasonable degree of job security and the existence of an effective internal job ladder to provide opportunities for promotion.

Whilst it is true that employment in the Bottling department did not necessarily mean employment in the same task over the years, there is no indication that movement from task to task was related to any type of skills or status hierarchy. Rather, it appears merely to be a mechanism to meet the company's specific needs at a specific time. It is true that it was possible for a man who remained with the company to make some progress within the department, presumably because the turn-over rate was so much higher than in other parts of the brewery. Most men would begin in some form of general labouring and might then take on additional responsibilities over time, for which they could earn a few shillings a week on top of their basic wage. The workforce, for instance, was divided into a number of gangs and each of these would have its own leading hand. Thus, advancement might come, although it could be slow in the process, as the career of J. Segust demonstrated:

1909: Joined the Bottling Store, aged fifteen

1911: Moved to Cold Stores

1919: Deputy Foreman, Cold Stores

1940: Foreman, Cold Stores

1950: Relinquished post and put in charge of Ships Store and Export Beer stocks

(15)

The women employed in Bottling were engaged exclusively on the processes of bottle washing, filling, stoppering and labelling. Their position within the workforce was low grade and low paid. In 1914, boys working in the Bottling department were earning the same basic wage as women, although the gap did widen marginally in favour of women after the war. However, any opportunity for advancement by a woman worker was actually reduced by the time that war came to an end. In 1914, it was recorded in the wages materials that payments were being made to a Forewoman and an Assistant Forewoman. Although it is not shown whence they came, it seems probable that they had been promoted from within the women's labour force. At some point during the war, the way in which the department was organised was modified, so that the women came under the control of a Foreman. Although a woman Welfare Worker was brought in to look after the interests of the women, she was a member of the clerical staff and not promoted from the shop floor.

The women earned a uniform rate of pay with the possibility of an additional payment, generally in the region of two shillings per week if they worked on a

specific machine or undertook a specific task. That such conditions of employment did not engender the same

**Table VIII - Percentage of workers with more than six years service in Bottling 1914 and 1920**

	1914	1920
Men	34.5	57.2
Women	13.7	4.8 (16)

degree of company loyalty that was evident amongst a significant part of the male workforce is indicated by the fact that the brewery clearly did not retain the women during the war, when other forms of better remunerated employment were available. It should, of course, be remembered that the men indicated in the table might well have been fighting in the war, but would have continued to clock up years of service while they were away. It may be that this problem of keeping women workers was one of the factors that encouraged the Board to meet with representatives of the Brewers' Workers Union in August 1919 and to agree with them, inter alia, that women who were employed in bottling should have a five shilling per week pay rise. This improvement in wages clearly had a long-term beneficial effect on the company's ability to retain its women workers, for by 1936, 30.3 per cent of women workers in the department had more than six years service. Nonetheless, there was always a relatively high rate of

turnover, for women had to stop work on marriage. Thus, also in 1936, 35.3 per cent of the women had been employed for less than a year.

In many key respects then, bottling was different to other departments within the brewery. It employed large numbers of women; the age structure and length of service of its male workforce were both considerably lower than those of other departments; it lacked a clear internal job ladder and this was not compensated for by marginally higher wages, as was the case in the cooperage. It is not clear why this department should be so different. It was of course a completely new department and this may suggest that in some respects the behaviour of management may have undergone a modification when not constrained by the traditions of the past. Equally, as has been indicated, the new department did develop on a rather ad hoc basis in its early days and its different circumstances may merely be a reflection of this. As with so many other key issues, the answers are not to be found in the recorded discussions of the Directors. This seems to imply the latter, for the former would have involved a conscious change of strategy, which it seems probable would have been discussed at Board level.

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VII

1. Whitbread and Company, Whitbread Craftsmen, London, 1948, p.29-30
2. B.M. Browne, The Brewer's Art, Liverpool, 1949, p.48
3. Derived from various wage materials, GLC
4. ibid.
5. New Survey of London Life and Labour, volume V, London, 1933, p.84
6. Black Eagle, July 1935, 71
7. Directors' Minute Books, 6th May, 1915
8. Black Eagle, Autumn 1959, 12
9. Industrial Chemist, Modern methods in the brewing of beer: a description of the plant and processes at the Brewery of Messrs. Truman, Hanbury, Buxton and Co. Ltd., Spitalfields, Reprint, 1931, 10
10. New Survey of London Life and Labour, p.89
11. Derived from various wage materials pertaining to Bottling, GLC
12. New Survey of London Life and Labour, p.89
13. Derived from various wage materials pertaining to Bottling, GLC
14. Letter from Jeacock to E.N. Buxton, 9th November, 1932, Correspondence Folder, GLC
15. Black Eagle, Autumn 1959, 12
16. Derived from various wage materials pertaining to Bottling, GLC

## CHAPTER VIII - DISTRIBUTING THE PRODUCT AND OTHER

### WORK AT THE BREWERY

#### I - Distribution

As has already been indicated, by 1936 the Bottling department had its own delivery service. In addition to this, there were the drays, which were responsible for the movement of barreled beer. Before the First World War, acting in support of the drays there existed the stables. These continued their existence post-war, but within the Works department a group of workers who were designated at various times as either motors or transport were created in order to service deliveries, whether they be of bottled beer or of cask beer. An attempt will be made to examine each of these elements discretely, but of necessity there will be some degree of overlap.

The drays had their own separate and prestigious culture within the brewery, although it is clear that this did experience some modification between 1914 and 1920. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, draymen were perceived as a breed apart, as is suggested in an inter-war article in the 'Kent Reporter' which bemoaned the loss of this traditional stereotype:

Men and women wondered at his prestigious  
girth and marvelled at his phenomenal strength  
.... He was indeed a sight to be wondered at..  
.. He turned the scales, generally somewhere

between fifteen and twenty stone.... Probably on average, he consumed one pint of beer for every hour of the day he was on the road....

An honest, kindly, hardworking fellow.... (1)

That the burden of work that they carried out was extremely hard was transparently true. Their horses left the stables at 4.30am, and the drayman would face a fine of one shilling if he were not present for his name call at that time. The drays would then be loaded in one of three loactions, dependent on the type of beer that was to be delivered. The working day would not be completed until all the beer had been delivered, which could be very late indeed:

Some nights from about 10.30 to midnight (and I have known it to be later), drays could be seen standing in Brick Lane as far down as Hanbury Street on one side and below the Two Brewers on the other side, waiting their turn to enter the Cooperage Yard. (2)

The work was extremely heavy and carried with it a high degree of risk of injury and occupational disease such as bronchitis. Even were a man able to avoid the worst of this, "the nature of their lives is such that draymen are, as a rule, past work at between the ages of fifty and fifty-five." (3) For this reason, the department had its own Mutual Association, membership of which was compulsory, in order to insure against the various hazards associated with the job.

In view of the nature of the work, it is not surprising that the remuneration was good, although the earnings did tend to fluctuate quite widely because they were calculated on the basis of a small fixed weekly wage to which was added 'turn' money, a piece work rate that was derived from the distance covered and the number of full casks delivered, together with an arbitrary addition, which had originally been based on the number of empty casks returned. This practice was to continue into the post-war period. Thus, in the mid 1920s, to the basic driver's wage of forty-five shillings was added three shillings and sixpence if he had covered twenty-five miles and completed a third journey and a further five shillings should he complete a fourth journey. In addition, he received one penny for every cask returned to the brewery. (4)

In the early 1920s, the draymen initiated an attempt to abandon barrel money and introduce overtime in its place with the support of their union. This proved short-lived with the union returning to the Board asking for barrel money to be reinstated because "within nine months the horse draymen lost £300 - as this was the difference between the amount paid in overtime and the amount that would have been paid if barrel money had been accepted instead." (5) Indeed, the difference would have been greater had the Board applied the union's overtime rate of one shilling and threepence an hour rather than their own rate of one



shilling and sixpence. Although the Board did not explicitly present their actions as a mechanism for undermining union support, it seems likely that this might have been an anticipated outcome.

Although the nineteenth century system of payment worked to the benefit of those who worked on the horse drays, it also worked to the benefit of the company when applied to those who were employed on the motor drays because: "if a driver's magneto, carburettor or plugs or anything else goes wrong (which should be put right by him) and so delays him, he gets no extra pay and as a consequence we are never worried by the thought that the men are wasting time on the road. Extra pay is given only where a breakdown occurs over which the driver has no control." (6) This apparently less sympathetic treatment of the problems that motor draymen had to contend with did not appear to alter the relatively high status that was attached to this group of workers.

In the early 1920s, as the brewery moved towards mechanical drays, there were opportunities for those who wished to seize them. Jeacock, for instance, recorded the case of a general brewery labourer who spent his holiday obtaining a BSM driving certificate. On his return to work, he joined the motor night gang in order to gain the experience which subsequently enabled him to be made up to a driver. (7) Such an arrangement clearly worked to the benefit of both

parties: it gave members of the workforce an opportunity for improvement, but it also enabled the company to employ drivers from within the existing labour pool. It was not, however, presumably because of the relatively recent nature of the use of motor transport, always possible to achieve this. In 1919, when a night Foreman was required for the Motors, he had to be brought in from outside. This evidence therefore suggests that the wages paid and the incentives offered were sufficient both to attract men with experience from elsewhere and to encourage men within the brewery to spend time and money obtaining the appropriate qualifications. The management, apparently by default, appears to have succeeded in achieving the most cost effective method of wage payment for the immediate future, whilst having maintained the loyalty of the workforce by conceding the requests made of it.

The progression to drayman that had been established in the course of the nineteenth century followed a clear pattern. A man would begin as a trouncer, that is by helping to load and unload the drays. As his length of service advanced, he would anticipate being initially allowed to drive a dray as a fourth class drayman. As he gained more experience and his length of service increased still further he would expect to gain promotion, until he finally became a first class drayman. This would involve the payment of

an ever higher basic wage. Such a route was regarded as the norm and when its path was impeded could lead to industrial relations problems. In 1911, for example, a six hour strike by the drays was caused by the slowdown in the promotion of fourth class draymen into third class. The significance of the drays to the working of the brewery is clearly demonstrated by the short duration of the strike which was resolved by the decision of the Directors to create more dray teams, thus creating more opportunities for promotion through the classes. (8)

The twentieth century did see some improvement in the conditions of the draymen. Their working day had been shortened, so that they started at 6am. Loading had been speeded up both by better organisation and the building of new loading out stages. These were not, however, as has already been suggested, the most fundamental of the changes that had taken place in the department. As early as 1902, there had been a trial period with a motor dray, but this had not been successful and it had been returned to the manufacturer. There were further tentative experiments with motor vehicles, so that by the time war broke out, there was a regular steam vehicle service between Brick Lane and North Kent. On the whole though, the company was not very enthusiastic about the alternatives to horses and did not pursue them in a sustained way. What changed this policy was the lesson taught by the war

that mechanical transport could be both reliable and efficient. Thus, in 1919, the first petrol driven dray was brought into operation. The reaction of the draymen to this new innovation was unenthusiastic. The reason for this was not explicitly identified, although there are a variety of potential explanations. It could have been perceived as a loss of status, as an effective deskilling, although the evidence already presented suggests that this was not the case. It is unlikely that money was an issue in view of the considerable debate on methods of payment in the early 1920s. Perhaps the most probable explanation is merely a normal resistance to changes that affect working practices that have been established over a long period. In any event, in order to implement the changes, the Board found that "at last a definite instruction had to be given and the man who was the youngest drayman had to go on the lorry, and as the use of lorries increased, the man next in rotation was taken." (9) Thus, by the mid 1920s, it had become company policy to gradually replace the horse-drawn drays with petrol-driven drays over a period of time.

By the end of the First World War, draymen were no longer divided into classes. There remained in place however a well-defined path which a drayman could follow which persisted through the various technical changes outlined above. On first employment, a man would work as a trouncer, earning the same rate as

general labourers earned in other parts of the brewery, with the additional payment of barrel money. Eventually, he could aspire to employment as a team driver. In 1936, for every two trouncers employed in the drays, there was one team driver. Of the sixteen team drivers, eleven had been employed by the brewery before their twenty-first birthday, and the remaining five were all taken on in their twenties. This suggests that trouncers with reasonable amounts of service had a fair expectation that at some point in their career they might become a team driver. Using the evidence of 1936, it is worth pointing out that this process could be a very long one indeed. The minimum length of service of the team drivers employed in 1936 was twenty-five years, and some trouncers had longer service than that. Thus, a nineteenth century job ladder was replaced by an alternative one which removed some of the intermediate grades. In light of the long periods of service of the men in the department, it is clear that whether the various strategies being used by the management were conscious or not, they achieved the functional purpose of ensuring the long-term loyalty of this particular group of workers in a period when the fundamental nature of the work that they were engaged upon was in the process of change.

In the period before the First World War, the drays were supported in their work by the stables. Men working in this department had to be up with the horses

ready before the day's deliveries began and to remain until the last dray returned and had been unloaded at night. The basic wage compared unfavourably with that earned elsewhere in the brewery, but additional payments for overtime working, weekend working and special responsibilities brought the take-home pay up to a level that was comparable to that being earned by those workers who had some degree of skill, such as coopers. It would appear that the conditions of service were acceptable to the men for even by the brewery's standards, there was a remarkably low turnover of workers. In 1914, twenty-three of the twenty-eight employed in the stables had more than ten years service, while in 1920, of the twenty-two employees, twenty had more than ten years of service.

By 1920, it was clear that the fundamental changes that were taking place in the drays would also have profound implications for the stables. The slight fall in the number of employees identified as taking place between 1914 and 1920 accelerated considerably so that by 1936 there were only eight employees left. The principal way in which this reduction in numbers was effected was through retirement. In order to achieve this, men might be retired earlier than was the norm; the Foreman farrier, for example, was retired in 1921 at the age of sixty. In order to complete the reduction in numbers, there did have to be some dismissals, but the company did try to find alternative work for these

men elsewhere in the brewery. In 1921, of the five men 'dismissed', four were re-employed in other departments. Such a clear expression of concern for the future of the men would doubtless operate to reinforce the view that all those who were associated with the company were part of a family, sharing concerns about the welfare of each individual member. Whether this was a conscious strategy or merely a genuine concern is not explicitly addressed in the source materials.

**Table IX - Grades within the Stables 1914 - 36**

	1914	1920	1936
Foreman	1	1	1
Deputy Foreman	1	1	1
Horsekeeper	19	14	{ 6 (but
Farrier	5	3	{ exact
Saddler	1	1	{ work not
Harness cleaner	1	2	{ identified)
Total	28	22	8

(10)

The decline in the numbers employed in the stables had a direct impact on the type of work that was done. Before 1920, there were a number of specific tasks that were engaged in by specific workers who received additional payments for the work, such as chaff cutters, farriers, saddlers and harness cleaners. By 1936, there was only one classification other the Foreman, which was that of horsekeeper. No indication is given of specific duties, although it is fairly clear that the virtual obliteration of this department

was well advanced.

The corollary to the contraction of the stables was the expansion of the Motor Transport department. In 1914, this had not even existed. When motor vehicles had been required by the company, they had been hired as part of the experimentation procedures. By 1920, the department was employing forty-five men and by 1936 it had grown to eighty-three. Much of it was located in areas where the stables had been hitherto, although by 1936 even this did not prove adequate to meet all its storage needs, so the Board began to examine the possibility of purchasing property from the City of London Corporation. (11) From the end of the war, there does appear to have been considerable flexibility in the movement of men between the three departments of drays, transport and bottling deliveries as a matter of routine. Men would tend to acquire their experience of motors in transport, where they would be employed on some of the maintenance and would be required to move the vehicles around the site. They might then hope to achieve promotion to driver's mate and ultimately driver. The opportunities, initially at least, were greater in the bottling deliveries as this went over to mechanical deliveries in a more complete way and at an earlier stage than the drays, as there were no existing employment structures to be modified.

There was one further possible element in the transportation of the product, and that was provided by



the wharf. This had been opened at Wapping in 1841 to facilitate the movement of the raw materials required for brewing, such as hops and malt from Kent, Essex and Suffolk, and for the movement of beer, both by barge direct to Chatham and later Colchester for onward distribution and by dumb barges to steamers in the Thames by which it would be conveyed to other English and foreign ports. The wharf was not used exclusively for products pertaining to the brewery, but also operated as a public wharfinger. With the development of motor transport, much of its contract work disappeared and even the journey to Chatham could be more cheaply and conveniently effected by the use of vans. Therefore in 1931, the wharf was shut, with its workers being given the option of re-employment at Brick Lane. The numbers employed had never been large - ten before the war and eight afterwards, but what all the men had in common was that they had gone to the wharf after a reasonable period of employment at Brick Lane, during which time they had no doubt demonstrated the sense of honesty that was so important in the successful running of a wharf. The wages being earned in the period prior to closure ranged from eighty shillings for three of the men to eighty-eight shillings for the remaining four, with the Foreman earning one hundred and ten shillings. As all the men had similar employment histories it can only be inferred that the difference in wages represented a

difference in the type of work being done. What such a difference might have entailed it is impossible to say as the only direct references that are made to the wharf involve the costs of new buildings and new barges.

## II - Supporting services

Once started with his buildings, machinery, horses, carts, barrels, backs and vats etc, a London brewer will keep upon his regular staff a large number of men for the repair or further increase of his plant. Work is put out by all to a greater or lesser extent, but the larger the brewery, the more completely it is self-sufficient. (12)

As one of the larger London brewers, Trumans employed a substantial number of men within the Works department. In the mid 1880s, it was recorded by one visitor that one hundred and fifty men were employed in this department, (13) and by 1936 the number stood at two hundred and ninety-nine, although this did include the eighty-three men already referred to as working in the motors section. Appendix I provides a list of the various sections into which the Works was divided with a breakdown of the number of employees in each section. Much of the work of the department was carried out at the Coverley Fields site, where there was adequate room for the storage of the various raw materials that were used in the variety of crafts that were pursued. Some of this work was transferred to the Brick Lane site in the 1920s as the rebuilding programme there progressed.

A brief survey of some of the crafts will indicate the variety of work that was carried out in-house. The bricklayers worked both within the

brewery and in the tied trade. The inter-war period saw a substantial rebuilding programme of the brewery in order to facilitate the company's use of new developments, especially with regard to bottling and transport. In the trade, as it has previously been suggested, the experiences of the war led to some modifications in perceptions about the nature of licensed premises. Increasingly, brewers were concerned with making them more pleasant environments in order to attract new types of customers. The pages of 'Black Eagle' are full of accounts of new and altered public houses. This work was supported by carpenters, painters, plumbers and electricians. The coppersmiths and millwrights were engaged in producing and maintaining equipment for use within the brewery. The wheelwrights, inter alia, produced the wheels for the two-wheeled drays which were also manufactured within the Works department by the Motors section. Sign carpenters made the signs that hung outside the company's public houses. These signs had been decorated and subsequently maintained by the company's sign painters.

A number of those who were engaged in craft positions had joined the company from elsewhere. In each of the sections referred to, there were generally one or two boys undergoing an apprenticeship, but this was never enough to keep the brewery fully supplied with the skilled men that were needed. The conditions

of employment and the wages earned by the skilled men were determined by the prevailing hourly rate that had been negotiated nationally by the relevant trade society. The number of permanent labourers was kept low as a matter of policy. This meant that in times of economic depression, the Works provided another potential source of employment for permanent men who might otherwise have been laid off. Here they would be employed on such tasks as the painting of the brewery or by supporting other labourers in unskilled work.

For the permanent labourer who was assigned to this department there was thus the certainty of a craft's negotiated hourly rate, but little prospect of movement through a task-related skills hierarchy to a more senior position. In 1920, the plumber's assistant was the son of the plumber. By 1936, whilst the plumber remained, the son, who had been refused an apprenticeship by the company, did not. Thus, lack of opportunity seems to have precipitated the younger man's decision to leave. The best that an unskilled labourer could hope for was that he would come to Jeacock's attention as a capable worker so that he would be transferred to an occupation elsewhere in the brewery where it would be possible to develop the type of limited skill through repetition that has been referred to elsewhere. That this did happen is apparent. Lists of boys employed in the Works department were maintained with remarks such as

"Bright," "Strong, make a good carman," as well as more personal details about family background. (14) By following some of the career paths, it is possible to track some of these boys to other parts of the brewery.

It is clear that especially in the industry-specific tasks, such as the coppersmiths, the general tendency of most departments to long service existed, although it is true that all sections contained some men with long service. However, in view of the large number of men employed in the Works, the fact that they were clearly divided into discrete sections and given the established role of the craft societies in determining wages, it is difficult to draw general conclusions about the issues that have been addressed in relation to other departments.

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VIII

1. Quoted in Black Eagle, July 1934, 56-7
2. Article by Jeacock on 'Transport', undated but c.mid 1920s, Correspondence Folder, 4, GLC
3. Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People of London, series 2, volume 3, London, 1903, p.123
4. Article by Jeacock, loc. cit., 8
5. ibid., 7
6. ibid., 9-10
7. ibid., 11
8. Directors' Minute Books, 17th August, 1911
9. Article by Jeacock, loc. cit., 7
10. Information derived from materials on stables wages, GLC
11. Directors' Minute Books, 2nd August, 1936
12. Charles Booth, op. cit., p.117
13. A. Barnard, Noted Breweries of Great Britain and Ireland, London, 1888, p.204
14. List of boys in the Works Department, 8th November 1932, Correspondence Folder, GLC

## CHAPTER IX - CONCLUSIONS

The two principal elements of this work have dealt respectively with the management and the workforce of Truman, Hanbury and Buxton. With regard to the former, an examination was made of the nature of that management. This included an exploration of the potential motivations of the Hanbury, Buxton and Pryor families; the ways in which these families directed the organisation of the firm, both on a long-term and a short-term basis; and the relationship that existed between the families and the paid management. As far as the workforce were concerned, by following the production chain of beer, the variety of work and patterns of employment within the company were illustrated. Despite the great variety of occupations that have been examined, two principal patterns of employment can in fact be deduced. These two patterns pertain largely, but not exclusively, to the degree of skill which was attached to the occupation.

The first pattern of employment involved those with no skill of the commonly accepted type. This pattern was to be found in the Brewers, Cellars, Bottling and non-craft sections of the Cooperage and Works departments. Boys were always taken on in the first instance as temporary labour, with their position being reviewed once they had reached their twenty-first birthday (or eighteenth after 1933). Depending on the state of the economy or the season of the year, it was



also quite possible for adult labour to be taken on as temporary labour initially too. This arose from the Board's reluctance to lay off any of the permanent workforce when trade was slack. A pool of temporary labourers enabled the company to deal with the peaks of the trade whilst simultaneously providing a buffer for the permanent labourers. Thus, the first hurdle for many employees was to cross this barrier separating temporary from permanent employment. This would not necessarily be achieved at the first jump. In conversation with a former employee, who preferred to remain anonymous, he indicated that he had first been taken on as a temporary labourer in Bottling in 1927, but was laid off again by the company after a short period. In that short time though, he had obviously made a good impression because a year later the company wrote to him offering him a permanent job in the Cellars.

Having become a permanent employee, the ordinary labourer would almost certainly be attached to an experienced man, who would train the labourer in the processes associated with the particular type of work that was undertaken in the department to which he had been assigned. As long as the labourer was engaged entirely in this type of unskilled work, he might well find himself being moved from department to department on a fairly regular basis to meet the immediate needs of the company within the economic constraints of the

day. The next progression that he might hope to make would be to be attached to a particular process for a sufficient period to achieve the status of an 'experienced' man, who had developed a limited skill through repetition. This progression might occur in the original department to which the man had been assigned or might occur after a movement between departments. Within the context of the brewery, such a man would frequently be regarded as semi-skilled by both the management and other workers, although this status was not the result of any specific training beyond the constant repetition of the task. The remuneration for this was an additional payment made on top of the basic labourer's rate. The additional payment would relate specifically to the additional responsibility being undertaken. The nature of this would vary from department to department, but would most frequently relate to working on a particular piece of machinery or undertaking a particular task which could range from cleaning the copper to being in charge of a small gang of men. There could also be elements of reward in a slightly larger than normal Christmas bonus.

The wage records indicate that such additional payments were achieved by a number of longer-term employees. It was from this group of semi-skilled workers that the Foreman would be selected. The criteria for selection is not explicitly articulated in the available records, but what is clear is that the

management were always conscious of the need to identify those men who at some future point might be promoted. Thus, in the margins of the wages books, there are to be found frequent references to the abilities of individual workers, which give clues to those who have been marked out for possible advancement in the future. The "good man" of 1927 turned into the supervisor of 1934. (1) Those who were so selected though, did not necessarily want that advancement. The anonymous interviewee indicated that when he returned to the brewery after his service during the Second World War, he was offered the opportunity to take the requisite training to become a Foreman, but turned it down because despite the increase in basic wages, it would have involved the loss of the additional responsibility money and overtime that he earned as a process worker. It seems likely that this narrow financial gap would also have been a characteristic of the inter-war period.

The second pattern of employment pertained to those who exercised some degree of skill in the more traditional sense. These workers, who were employed in the Cooperage and the Works, could have used their skills to effect a transfer to an employer other than a brewer. To work in these areas it was necessary to have served an apprenticeship. There was the possibility of serving this within the brewery: there were generally one or two boys attached to every craft that was

carried on. Again, there are no explicit criteria provided in the sources regarding the selection of boys for these apprenticeships, but there are two general indicators, although it is not possible to state whether these were used separately, together or in conjunction with other criteria. The first of these indicators was attendance at a local boys' school which had developed close links with the brewery and whose curriculum the Board had indicated was of a type that would enable a boy to be suitably employed at the brewery. The second indicator, as revealed by an examination of those boys who were engaged in apprenticeships in the inter-war period, was some form of personal link to the brewery. This link was most commonly the employment of a father in the brewery. This did not mean that the father had to be employed in a skilled occupation; the sons of unskilled men were as likely to be apprenticed as the sons of skilled men. The key prerequisite was the reliability of the father.

Once the skill had been acquired, whatever the channel for it, the brewery generally paid the prevailing craft rate for the job. It was only very rarely that the brewery's rate would exceed the craft rate. On those occasions when it did, it is possible that it was part of a strategy to undercut union support, although such an interpretation is not supported by specific evidence. The rate itself might be calculated on an hourly basis, as was the case for

most of those who were employed in skilled occupations in the Works, or it might be calculated on the basis of a basic rate with an element of piece work involved, as was the case in the Cooperage. Despite the fact that only the minimum rate was being paid, that opportunities for promotion to Foreman were fairly limited because of the total numbers of those employed in similar capacities and that many of the men had job-transferable skills, the indications are that most of the skilled workers were satisfied with their employment, as labour turnover was relatively low, with the majority of those employed staying with the company for long periods.

There is one group of brewery workers who do not fit easily into either of the two models outlined above, but who contain elements of both. That group of workers was the draymen. Their pattern of advancement, perhaps not unsurprisingly, was closer to that of the first group of workers, in that they were likely to be taken on initially on a temporary basis. If they remained with the company, they would follow a fairly well-established pattern of advancement to permanent labour to trouncer to driver's mate through various categories of driver to deputy Foreman to Foreman, acquiring some measure of skill along the way derived from physical strength and constant repetition. It is at this point that the features that characterised the drays begin to move closer to those of the second

group. The skills that they used in driving the drays were 'job-transferable' in that they could be used in any distributive trade, although it is unlikely that drivers in other industries were held in such generally high esteem as were draymen. There is a second way, however, in which the drays were closer to the skilled men and that is the way in which they were paid. Like the coopers, the draymen were paid a basic rate to which was added additional sums calculated on a piece work basis. Although this method operated to the benefit of the management after the introduction of mechanised vehicles, it was a system whose working had been actively encouraged by the draymen themselves with the support of their union.

This brief analysis should make it clear that the economic structure of the Esat End of London was not merely characterised by the desperation and despair of those who were engaged in the sweated and associated trades. There clearly existed other forms of labour control and Truman, Hanbury and Buxton provide a good example of the existence of these alternatives. It is to an examination of the key strategies that were employed by the management that attention will now be directed. In this way, it is hoped that the experiences of this particular company can be used to elucidate some of the current thinking about the nature of workplace relationships and the strategies that are employed by management to control those relationships.

Trumans was typical of the sort of family-controlled firm engaged in the capital intensive production of a branded, packaged commodity that persisted in Britain well into the twentieth century. As Chandler has indicated, such companies continued to manage their business in the same ways as their predecessors: "At most food and beverage companies, the same families continued during the inter-war years to manage their enterprises in a personal manner from the same offices their forebears had established next to the original factories or process plants. Most did continue to expand their production facilities and to enlarge their marketing operations at home.... Many added warehouses and fleets of trucks." (2) Such methods achieved profitability; they were used by virtually every branded, packaged company that figured in the index of the top two hundred companies by share value with the exception of Levers. This does not mean that these methods were necessarily the most efficient, but as many of these companies, brewers especially, faced little or no foreign competition, there was little pressure to initiate fundamental changes of management technique. This makes it harder in some respects to evaluate the nature of workplace relationships at Trumans. It should be remembered that not only were the members of the founding families continuing practices that had been established by their predecessors, but that many of the workforce were

second and third generation employees of the company. Thus, practices that were in use would not necessarily be seen as conscious strategies of labour control either by those implementing them or by those whom they affected.

This in a sense is one of the key questions that arises. Did the management of the company employ implicit strategies that were not recognised as such? Or was the management engaged in explicit strategies that it did not articulate? Gospel's notion of the 'strategic choice' that is available to companies implies that the latter alternative was occurring in some companies and that it gave employers considerable flexibility insofar as it meant that the appropriate strategy could be implemented with the appropriate group at any given point in time. Gospel argues that the lack of articulated documentation as to the existence of such a strategy should not be taken as proof that the strategy did not exist. (3) It is certainly true that the management of Trumans did, on occasions, appear to lack a clear strategy and to be subject to external pressure. On numerous occasions, after meetings with group of workers or their representatives from craft societies or trade unions, the Board appeared to capitulate to the demands being made of it. However, access to the Directors' Minute Books shows that any concessions made were generally the result of long and carefully considered discussions



at Board level. It is further true that two distinctive forms of worker control were apparent during the inter-war period, namely paternalism/welfare work for all workers employed in the brewery and internal labour markets for the unskilled workers. As in the Gospel model, neither of these strategies is explicitly recognised as a form of labour control. In order to try and resolve this issue, it is necessary to turn to look at these two strategies.

The company had been in existence for nearly two hundred and fifty years by the start of the twentieth century. In the course of that time, a considerable number of practices and attitudes had grown up on the part of both the management and the workers. Although the financial structure of the company had been modified at the end of the nineteenth century, this had not resulted in any profound change in the style of management, so that those who sat on the Board of Directors in the inter-war period were the heirs to a long tradition of paternalism, service and philanthropy which had characterised the company since at least the early nineteenth century. It may appear that the origins of this tradition involved a genuine social conscience that arose from the religious background. It is further clear that many members of the families felt a real sense of duty in continuing those practices that their ancestors had initiated, as the previously quoted letter from Noel Buxton to E.N. Buxton indicated. It

should not be forgotten however that brewery welfare existed in most brewing companies, even where they did not share the same background. It is therefore likely that during the nineteenth century, the benefits of paternalism in contributing to an efficient and loyal workforce had become apparent to various brewery managements. Thus, however altruistic the motives both for originally implementing paternalistic practices and subsequently maintaining them, there must have been an awareness of its beneficial business effects.

In the early part of the twentieth century, notions of paternalism were developed and modified by the creation of the overt management strategy that was known as 'welfare work', which arose as part of a wider contemporary debate on methods of management which included Taylorism and scientific management. It is clear that the management were involved in a consideration of the various merits of the debate. Not only did they move in the same social and political circles as some of the leading commentators, such as Rowntree and Cadbury, but more solid evidence of their awareness can be found in some of the articles published in 'Black Eagle', such as Jeacock's articles on Works Management in 1933 and 1934, or Christine Hanbury's article on her visit to the United States in 1931. It might also be reasonable to suppose that both the establishment of the Works Committee and of the 'Black Eagle' itself owed something to the influence of

the ideas of 'welfare work'.

Theoretically, in the British variant at least, it was intended that welfare work should be less patronising than traditional forms of paternalism. It was argued that the labour force should have foreknowledge of their entitlements and receive them as of right, not as the consequence of the charity of their employers. It is transparently clear that in a variety of ways this shift of attitude did not take place at Trumans. The mythology of the employer family that Joyce saw as central to nineteenth century paternalism, rather than diminishing after the First World War, was in fact becoming increasingly more overtly developed through mechanisms such as the sports day and the use of the 'Black Eagle' to record events in the lives of the three families, such as births, coming of age and marriages. Strategies associated with the welfare work movement that gave greater rights to the workers, such as a clearly laid down pension scheme, were ignored. Other strategies which clearly enabled the management to reinforce the deferential relationship between themselves and the workforce, such as the limited powers of the Works Committee, were selectively adopted. This could be seen as an explicit strategy that was not being articulated overtly, which would thus support Gospel's conclusions.

In one sense, it would come as no surprise that in the inter-war period the Board was looking for

methods of extending their control over the workforce and improving the efficiency of the company. This was a period of great change and development in the brewing industry, with the advent of bottling, with its employment of an increasing number of women, with the introduction of petrol-driven vehicles and the substantial building work that had to be undertaken in order to accommodate this. It was shown that although the welfare provisions of the company were extended to men and women working in these areas, in other respects of their working lives, changes were made that operated to the advantage of management. In view of the considerable investment of capital that all the new developments entailed, especially given that this was a period that was characterised by periodic falls in trade, it would certainly have appeared to have been sound business and common sense to make use of any policy that would enhance the efficiency of the company. As Reid has pointed out, it could be that the motivation guiding employers had little to do with any overt desire to subordinate the labour force, but was rooted in the simple wish "to make profits under given economic conditions which varied from case to case."

(4)

The non-wage benefits that were provided via the paternalistic/welfare work mechanism clearly achieved important objectives for the company. Wages were either marginally lower than in other comparable occupations

or merely matched the prevailing craft rates and yet labour turnover was low, with many employees working for the company for the duration of their working lives. Son followed father into the brewery, and indeed, families can be tracked over a number of generations. There did exist, it is true, the types of problem that one would associate with an enterprise of this nature, such as occasional drunkenness or pilfering or laziness, but these are not the dominant themes that are found in the records. This degree of co-operation could not have been mere good fortune, but was clearly generated at least in part by the paternalistic practices that have been examined in the course of this work. In view of the longevity of the strategy, it seems likely that it was not only the families of the Board who felt a sense of duty in maintaining them, but that the workforce would have perceived their provision as an integral part of their conditions of service and would have resisted any attempt on the part of management to remove them. Such a long-term view is highly unlikely to have been the consequence of an explicit strategy, but its results would certainly have been welcomed by the management. Welfare provision therefore fulfilled certain key objective functions for the management.

Paternalistic practices affected all members of the workforce and were clearly the key to the sense of loyalty and co-operation that existed within it.

However, amongst the unskilled segment of the workforce, an internal job ladder of the type identified by Littler can be seen in operation, which almost certainly would have operated to further reinforce the position of the management. As has already been suggested, a man taken on by the company could move up through a number of levels during the course of his working life. He would move from temporary to permanent to semi-skilled status through task repetition to deputy Foreman to Foreman. Virtually all promotion through this sector took place among those who were already in employment with the company. It was a very rare occurrence for a man to be brought in from outside to a position part way up the job ladder. It has been indicated in this work that advancement was likely to take place over a number of years, although it was quite possible for the potential of an individual worker to be identified at an early stage in his career. The existence of such possibilities for promotion within a well-established internal hierarchy must have acted as a strong incentive to continued service to unskilled workers whose only effective qualification was their physical strength.

This pattern of employment had pertained in the brewery for at least a century. It seems most likely that it arose as an ad hoc response to the specific demands of the industry rather than as an overt means of labour control. It is clear however, that its

existence must have reinforced the continued use of paternalistic practices in contributing to a low labour turnover. It would have further benefitted the management insofar as it would have kept the costs of training workers for specific tasks to a minimum, thus improving the economic efficiency of the firm. Such advantages would have undoubtedly manifested themselves in the operation of the system over the years, so that by the twentieth century, like paternalism, it would be seen as an integral part of the operating practices of the brewery both by the management and by the employees with both sides having an interest in its continued existence. Indeed, as has been pointed out, when the draymen felt the process was not taking place swiftly enough in 1911, it formed the basis for strike action. It has been suggested that although it may be possible to infer that the continued practice of paternalism/welfare work was not being explicitly articulated, it was being explicitly pursued as an instrument of policy because of the ways in which the Board chose to modify it. It is not possible to draw similar inferences with regard to the existence of internal job ladders because they continued to exist with no substantial modifications, even when, for example, the drays changed from being propelled by horses to being motor-driven.

Managerial strategy at Trumans was thus comprised of two key strands - paternalism modified by some of

the thinking that informed the welfare work debate and internal job ladders. Together, these strategies operated on the workforce to create a real sense of loyalty to the company which manifested itself in a low labour turnover in spite of slightly inferior remuneration. The first of these strategies clearly conforms to Gospel's arguments regarding 'strategic choice'. It was an appropriate strategy for achieving the objectives identified and it was economically viable because of the capital nature of the industry. It was not explicitly articulated as a strategy for labour control in any of the materials. This may be because it was such an inherent part both of the brewing industry and of the Hanbury and Buxton legacy that it did not need to be articulated. In any event, the modifications that arose appear merely to be the payment of lip service to the wider developments that were taking place, and for this reason appear to support Gospel's contention that a strategy can exist without being articulated. The second strategy was also an inherent legacy of the past, but continued unmodified. Although it conforms in many respects to Littler's model of internal job ladders, the fact that it cannot be determined whether this was an explicit strategy that is not articulated or an implicit strategy that was not recognised, makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about it.

What is clear in respect of both the strategies



that were employed, whether consciously or not, the company achieved its objectives. Thus, as Melling suggests, both the welfare provision and indeed the use of internal job ladders fulfilled functional objectives for the company. Individual Board members were pursuing a strategy that they found morally acceptable, in that it showed a concern for the quality of life of those whom they employed. Yet it was also a strategy that enabled the company to thrive and produce a good return on its capital for its shareholders. With very little change this remained the over-riding attitude of the management from at least the early nineteenth century right through beyond the Second World War period. It was an attitude that even survived the ending of the control of the company by the families in 1971. When Maxwell Joseph took it over in that year, he showed an almost idiosyncratic commitment to considerable autonomy for the new Board, which enabled them to maintain the company's long established traditions. It was only with his death in 1982 that Trumans was brought into the mainstream of Grand Metropolitan management and gradually forced to abandon those practices and attitudes that had characterised its organisation for the best part of two hundred years. Whatever the motives that underlay the strategies, there are many who regret their passing and their replacement by new strategies that take little account of the human dimension in business.

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
# APPENDIX I

## NUMBERS EMPLOYED IN THE BREWERY IN SAMPLE YEARS

Department		1914	1920	1936
Burton floor		5	15	10
Brewers		62	73	76
Cellars		30	33	28
Finings		2	2	2
Cooperage		48	54	55
Bottling	Men	93	56	124
	Women	51	42	119
	Total	144	98	233
	Delivery	-	-	93
Drays		50	70	53
Stables		28	22	8
Works	Bricklayers	14	31	54
	Carpenters	12	12	12
	Coppersmiths	23	14	22
	Millwrights	10	51	48
	Motors	-	45	83
	Painters	2	18	-
	Plumbers	1	2	2
	Sign carpenters	9	10	8
	Sign painters	2	8	7
	Smiths	3	5	5
	Watchmen	11	17	18
	Wheelwrights	22	18	14
	Not given	1	-	-
	Total	110	231	299

Electricians	-	-	13
Canteen Men	-	-	8
Women	-	-	4
Total	-	-	12
TOTAL	479	544	815

## Appendix II - UK Drink Consumption per Head, 1850 - 1914



(16; chapter II)

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